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VALIDITY OF SYSTEMS APPROACH AND FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS
AS APPLIED TO THE FRENCH COMMUNIST PARTY

THESIS

Presented to the Department of Political Science
Faculty of the University of Texas at El Paso
in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements

For the Degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

By

Francois Petry

February, 1974

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PREFACE

Although the content of this work is original, it seeks to apply, explain and expand the work of others. Particularly, I am indebted to two French authors who are abundantly quoted in this paper. First, I am indebted to Madame Annie Kriegel, Professor at the University of Paris, whose book, Les Communistes Français, has been an indispensable work tool for me after having been stimulating and inspiring reading. I can only hope that one day this book will be translated into English. I am also indebted to Professor Georges Lavau of the Institut d'Etudes Politiques who provided a new realm of inquiry for me while attempting to apply functionalism to the French Communist Party and whose theory of the "tribunitial function" has been retained in my thesis.

I would also like to thank the Department of Political Science of The University of Texas at El Paso for having made available to me my Teaching Assistantship, The International Student Office for their assistance and my Academic Committee for their advice and cooperation.

Special thanks for his deep concern and time must go to Dr. Z. Anthony Kruszewski, who pressured, advised and encouraged, read and commented at every stage of this writing.

Finally, I want to thank Beatrice, Yvon, Magnus, Dolores, Manuel and most of all Ana for their help, understanding and affection.

PROLOGUE

Social scientists are eager for models, hoping, without attempting predictions, that their examinations will be useful for reflection and research. Comparative politics does not escape this recent trend and numerous "systems" models or approaches have been originated and/or applied within this scope; of these, two are particularly influential: systems analysis and functionalism.

This thesis represents an attempt to test the validity of both approaches as applied to the French Communist Party. It has become common place to say that the French Communist Party is the result of the intervention of two distinctive influences: the International Communist Movement and the French Political System, and that from this situation stems the fact that it is both within and outside the latter. With this observation in mind, we can ask whether systems analysis and functionalism could account fully for an inquiry into the participation of the Communist Party in the French Political System. Indeed, the social and political reality in which the French Communist Party functions differs substantially from the reality which was the context within which these approaches originated.

Chapter Outline

Chapter One consists of a brief introduction to the French Communist Party which should provide the reader with sufficient knowledge of the history and nature of that party, in order to follow the development of

the paper. Chapter Two deals with the application of systems analysis (and more particularly, Easton's framework of analysis) to French communism and its interrelations with the French Political System. Chapter Three is an inquiry of the application of functionalism (more precisely, empirical functionalism) to the French Party.

Within this thesis, I attempt to show that both frameworks, elaborated by American political scientists who are used to thinking of a system where political conflicts and ideas have never been incarnated in a lasting revolutionary movement such as communism, are not totally adequate when applied to the French Communist Party.

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Chapter 1

THE FRENCH COMMUNIST PARTY: HISTORICAL DESCRIPTION

What are the inputs experienced by the French Communist Party (FCP) and to what extent have they changed in comparison with the inputs experienced by the Party at its origin? As Richard Cornell points out:

Each Communist movement functions in a specific institutional environment determined in part by its subscription to the organizational principles of marxism-leninism or the Soviet model, and in part by its adaptation of these principles according to a number of internal and external pressures...¹

One could thus uncover the particular combination of influences which have shaped and are shaping the French Communist Movement by exploring the importance of each environment for the functioning of that movement.

To be sure, the system of the French Communist Party is interrelated with many other systems which constitute its environment and are sources of inputs for it. However, for the purpose of analytic simplification, we will limit our investigation to two systems in that environment: the French Political System and the International Communist Movement.

Another point is here necessary to make for the reader. Indeed, what do we mean by International Communist Movement or System? By that, we refer merely to an analytical simplification of the reality. In fact, it could very well be argued that such a System does not exist any more and the author would agree. But, in that sense, the term System is understood as a reality,

a collection of parties and states unified in a centralized world organization. It must be understood at the onset that the term system of the International Communist Movement cannot be applied to a real set of structures, at least, not after World War II.

ORIGIN OF THE FRENCH COMMUNIST PARTY

The French Communist Party (FCP) was created during the Congress of Tours in December 1920. It was comprised by a majority group of dissidents from the older French Socialist Party (French Section of the Worker's International — SFIO).²

The system of the FCP has been affected at its origin by the introduction of "exogeneous" patterns of behavior. In the first place, the Communist International created in 1919 was a world party and each local Communist party was to be considered as an "avant garde" of the International on the revolutionary front, a constitutive element of a unified and centralized organization directed from Moscow. From this characteristic stem two consequences: (1) in order to become a true revolutionary party, the French Communist Movement had to go through the process of "bolshevization" which consisted of applying to the French section the organizational and doctrinal patterns of a Bolshevik party. (2) The other consequence refers to the Communist strategy and its effect on the relationships between the FCP and the French Political System. The French Communist Party was not only situated at the extreme left of the French political spectrum, it was also a revolutionary party and as such, totally opposed to the interests of the bourgeois dominant society. Contrary to the French Socialist Party, the FCP was willing to reject any conceding of opportunism and electoralism. To the old distinction between Right and Left which had marked the French political scene for fifty years, Communists substituted the distinction class against class.

The Congress of Tours

In 1919, the crucial problem for the worker's movement in France (i.e. the Socialist Party--SFIO and the labor movement represented by the unified General Confederation of Labor--CGT) was to decide what attitude would be adopted with respect to the Soviet Revolution. More precisely, the question was whether the French Socialist Movement should participate in the reconstruction of the Second International which had collapsed during World War I or embrace the Third International and the twenty-one conditions of Lenin.

According to these conditions, the new Party had to adopt the appellation "Communist" in order to clearly distinguish itself from old Socialist parties which had betrayed the working class. The aim of the new Communist Party was the proletarian Revolution, the denunciation of "social patriotism", the policy of collusion and the breaking off with reformism. Other conditions emphasized the mobilization of workers for the defense of the Soviet Republic. In order to perform these tasks, the Party would combine legal and illegal actions in the army, in labor unions and other mass organizations, etc. As far as the organization of the Party was concerned it was to be organized in a centralist manner; with an iron discipline.

Three main groups can be identified within the SFIO according to their attitudes toward the Third International. The right of the Party (Socialist Committee for the Resistance to the Third International) led by Thomas, Blum and Renaudel wanted to rebuild the Second International as it had been and rebelled against the twenty-one points set up by Lenin as a condition for the adherence to its International in the name of the ancient French Socialist tradition. According to Renaudel, the Bolshevik solution was merely a "blanquism with Tartar flavoring"³ that could not be applied to French socialism,

given its republican and democratic tradition.

The center of the Socialist Party (Longuet, Faure) which had conquered the leadership of the Party in 1918, was willing to defend the Bolshevik Revolution but also wanted to keep the world Socialist Movement united. In fact, they would prefer the following solution: the melting of the Second and the Third Internationals into a new International Socialist movement into which would be injected the new blood of Russian bolshevism.

Finally, the left of the SFIO (Loriot, Lefebvre, Valliant-Couturier) along with revolutionary trade unionism (Monatte, Monmousseau) had as objectives to join the Communist International even though it would mean a rupture in the French Socialist Movement.

Where would the separation line be drawn between those who were to become the members of the new French Communist Movement and those who were to remain inside the old SFIO? Lenin and the leaders of the Third International were wishing at first that only the left faction of the SFIO would make the secession with the rest of the French Socialist and constitute the French Communist Party. However, the events of 1920—misfortune of the revolutionary movements in Europe; failure of social movements in France—provided the evidence that the rate of strength between revolutionary and established order was not favorable to the former any longer. A new strategy had to be elaborated, for the long term. Therefore, instead of limiting their ambitions to the revolutionary left of the SFIO, Lenin and the leaders of the Third International attempted to attract the majority of French Socialists in the ranks of the Third International.

During the Summer of 1920, Cachin and Frossard (leaders of the centrist trend within the SFIO) attended the Second Congress of the Communist International in Moscow. When they returned to France, there was the certitude that the

majority of French Socialists (Center and Left) would join the French Communist Party which was to be created. There was also the certitude that the rightist minority would remain separated and keep the old Socialist Party — SFIO.

At the Congress of Tours, the majority of the delegates (3.252 mandates out of a total of 4.763) voted for the adherence to the Third International and rejected a proposition aimed at maintaining the unity of French socialism.⁴ Thus, at the origin, the French Communist Party has a built-in following of numerous membership. In addition, the new Party kept the national daily paper l'Humanité and most of the national leaders. On the other hand, the SFIO kept the majority of the representatives in its ranks (55 out of a total of 68) and most local officials.

The creation of the FCP was thus the result of a compromise. The massive rallying of French Socialists to the Third International was based more on feeling and sentiment than on reason and doctrine. Most members of the new Communist Party who had formed under the auspices of the Second International did not seriously estimate what consequences would result from the adherence of their Party to the Third Communist International.

However, Lenin could not make any lasting concession to the tradition, prejudices and survivals of the old Socialist Movement within the new Communist Movement. Bolshevism was not only conceived by Lenin as a strategy for the Revolution; it was also and above all viewed as a world strategy and the International was the institutional sign of this world Revolution plan. As Annie Kriegel points out:

From then on, proletarian internationalism was no more what it was when given form in the First International; a kind of collective sensibility stemming from the feeling of belonging to the borderless community of the oppressed. It was no more what it was when exalting the Second International's Socialist

leaders, that is to say, an ecumenistic attitude based on humanism and ethics. Proletarian internationalism, from now on was above all a strategy, a concrete idea of the technique to employ for pulling down the present world society.⁵

The establishment of the French Communist Party had for purpose to attempt to break off the integration process of the French working class in the structures of the bourgeois society. From this stem two consequences: (1) a tactical consequence. Social democracy had become reformist in spite of revolutionary phraseology; in other terms, there had been a divorce within the Socialist Movement between the reality (i.e. the integration of workers organizations in the dominant system) and the alleged goals of these organizations. For their own part, Communist parties, aware of the past errors, would not hesitate to use all the weapons they could, legal as well as illegal, in order to create the conditions for the Revolution but also to preserve their exteriority from the established order. From this stem the "class against class" tactics. (2) an organizational consequence. Since the majority of French Communists were opposed or unaware of the kind of party Lenin wanted, he was determined to destroy from the inside and then to rebuild the French Communist Party on a new basis. This process of "bolshevization" started in 1924 and was an attempt to rebuild the Communist Party on the basis that would make it a true Bolshevik party that is; merely a national section of a world party directed from Moscow.

Bolshevization

The new Communist Party was expected to take the form of a counter-community representing the future Socialist society. The purpose of it was to prevent the originality of the Party by defending it against the risk of assimilation by the existing French society. The character of counter-

community of the FCP is primarily accounted for by the existence of a specific party elite. The presence of a hierarchy within the Party stems from an original choice. The Communist Party must be seen as a hierarchical micro-society, representative of the future Socialist society. Marx had always emphasized the necessity of a strong "encadrement" for Communist parties, however, the existence of a network of permanent cadres is Lenin's contribution. It is Lenin who developed the principle according to which it was necessary for a true revolutionary party to be led by "professional revolutionaries" and it is on this basis that the bolshevization of the FCP has been undertaken.

Until 1924, the French Communist Party did not possess a well developed corps of permanent leaders and cadres. In fact, the structures of authority that prevailed within the old French Socialist Party survived for a time in the new Communist Party. The first Communist leaders were mostly representatives in French Parliament, intellectuals and journalists, in short, "brillants amateurs" rather than professional appointees. After 1924, the date which marked the beginning of its bolshevization, the FCP was to be gradually provided with a complete network of "professional revolutionaries" springing from the French working class and devoting all of their time and energy to their Party.

The bolshevization has also been a period of assimilation by the French Communist Party. Assimilation of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine and also application of the organizational patterns of a Bolshevik party as they had been instituted by the Fifth Congress of the Communist International in 1925. The Marxist-Leninist doctrine rests upon two main concepts: "proletarian internationalism" and "dictatorship of the proletariat". According to these concepts, the final aim of the proletariat is to overthrow the

dictatorship of the bourgeoisie and this, at the world level. Communist parties occupy the central place in the process that will lead toward the Revolution. The Capitalist society is based on man's exploitation by man and this type of society is condemned to collapse. Thus, only the proletariat will bring about the solution for the contradictions of capitalism by instilling socialism. Communist parties represent the only organizations that will lead the working class toward the realization of the Socialist society. The norms and organization of a Communist party must rest on two characteristics. First, the entire organization is based on the cell and particularly, the enterprise cell set up in factories and other industrial plants where the working class is. The Communist base organization thus differs from the one observed in Socialist parties (i.e. section based on the place of residence). Second, the organizational framework of the French Socialist Party was characterized by the autonomy of each part from the next superior one. Moreover, parliamentary groups had a preponderant influence upon the party leadership. The contrary is true in the Communist Party where the party press and representatives are subordinated to the party leadership. The organization of the FCP is based on the principle of "democratic centralism" according to which all leaders are elected to all levels and acceptance of the decisions of the next superior leadership organism are compulsory.

Revolutionary Strategy

The strategy elaborated by the Third International in the early twenties had for its purpose the unity of the "proletarian (or workers) front" against the dominant class. In January 1922, the International made an "appeal to the proletarians of all countries" in order to form a "unique front and to oppose the entire working class against the exploiters".⁶ It was the

beginning of the "class against class" strategy which would last until 1934 in the case of the FCP. This strategy was aimed at attacking the French Socialist Party and its leaders and, at the same time, at attracting Socialist workers. A fratricide war was thus taking place between Socialists and Communists. In 1928, for example, at the occasion of the legislative elections, Maurice Thorez, at the time Organization Secretary of the FCP wrote:

The SFIO attempts by all means to divert the proletariat from the revolutionary struggle and to draw it towards submission to the bourgeoisie... The Communist Party breaks with the "petit bourgeois" ideology and the republican discipline*...., and places in its place the formidable antagonism between proletariat and bourgeoisie: class against class.⁷

At the eve of the 1932 elections, the "mot d'ordre" was still the class against class tactics.

We must engage in a more systematic offensive against the Socialist Party and its leaders and, at the same time, we must develop our "unique front" tactics in order to attract Socialist voters. There is no contradiction in the fact of attacking the leadership and attracting the workers. It is essential to set up a distinction between the Socialist party leadership and the workers who are behind or who still belong to the Socialist Party.⁸

Obviously, for the SFIO, the path toward the reunification of the French working class could only be the one of the reversion of the Communists to the Socialist Party. To the attack of Thorez, Leon Blum, leader of the Socialist Party, answered:

The unity of the workers necessarily requires from now on the destruction of the Communist leadership.⁹

* "Republican discipline" means in the French political vocabulary that, during elections, in case of a run off, the candidate of the Left who has received most votes in the first run will represent the entire Left in the second run against the candidate(s) of the Right. This tactics was used by Republican candidates against Royalist or Bonapartist candidates during the first stage of the Third Republic.

STRATEGIES OF THE FRENCH COMMUNIST PARTY

AFTER 1934

Many strategic changes have occurred in the history of the FCP. We can distinguish the following time periods in relation to Communist strategies:

- 1924-1934 Bolshevization and class against class tactics
- 1935-1938 Anti-Fascist strategy and participation of the FCP in the Popular Front
- 1939-1941 German-Soviet treaty
- 1941-1947 World War II and strategy of national participation
- 1947-1962 Cold War and strategic isolation of the FCP
- 1962 → International detente and strategic changes involving de-stalinization; doctrine of peaceful coexistence and peaceful transition to socialism

The "Front Populaire"

In July 1934, a pact was established between the FCP and the SFIO in which both parties pledged to unify their action against war, fascism and the center-right Government of the time. After long negotiations, a common agreement was ratified in January 1936 by the Communists, the Socialists and the Radical Party under the name of "Rassemblement Populaire". The purpose of this common agreement was to establish a common political platform for the next legislative elections as well as an electoral alliance. Victor Basch, Chairman of the National Committee of the "Rassemblement Populaire" made the following statement:

For the first time since the establishment of the Republic, all leftist parties and political organizations have agreed upon a limited and precise number of demands.¹⁰

What are the causes of this sudden strategic turn by the French Communist Party? The main cause obviously resided in the Fascist threat that menaced Western Europe since Hitler had come into power in 1933. French Communists and Socialists rapidly learned their lesson in face of the tragic experience of Marxist political movements in Italy and Germany (and later in Spain). Rather than to continue tearing up each other while a common enemy was perhaps about to destroy them, they decided to fight together in order to keep democracy alive. In June 1934, at the occasion of the National Conference of the French Communist Party at Ivry, Maurice Thorez who had been appointed Secretary General in 1931 defined the situation and proposed a new strategic orientation in the following terms:

The choice is not anymore between fascism and communism but between fascism and democracy... We want to realize at any price the unity of action with Socialists against fascism.¹¹

At any price..., this means that the FCP was ready to negotiate with the leadership of the SFIO and also with the CGT.* Thus, in the Summer of 1934, Gaston Monmousseau, Communist labor union leader, declared, referring to Socialist workers:

It is not a matter of bringing back the misguided to reason but to match with them as they are under their own flag and with their leaders.¹²

This strategic turn did not only concern the relationship between Communist and Socialist leaders. There was an important doctrinal change

* The CGT remained under Socialist influence after the Congress of Tours while Communists created a new labor union called CGT-U (Confédération Générale du Travail Unifiée). The negotiations between Socialists and Communists would lead to the reunification of the French labor movement under the leadership of the Socialist CGT in March 1936, at the Congress of Toulouse.

in the Communist Party which seemed willing to reintegrate national political life. For example, the French Communist Party took the defense of the bourgeois public order and legality. In October 1936, at the occasion of the National Congress of the Radical Party, the Central Committee of the FCP sent a letter to "Monsieur le Président Edouard Daladier" which proclaimed among other things:

Like you, we think that public order is indispensable... Public order cannot be conceived outside the respect of the law and this is why we are sure that you will agree totally with us when we ask for the law to be respected by all, like private property and people's savings.¹³

Communists proclaimed their adherence to liberal democracy:

Communists are never disinterested with the form of the political regime of the bourgeoisie. They have, they do and they will defend all democratic liberties which have been won by the masses.¹⁴

To the country:

Communists like their country.¹⁵

To non-proletarians:

We stretch out our hand to you Catholic..., artisan, peasant, because you are our brother... We stretch out our hand to you, soldier and veteran who came to the "Croix de Feu"^{*}, because you are a son of our people... because, like us, you do not want the country to be ruined.¹⁶

The 1936 electoral campaign was very ardent. In the first run both right and left blocs remained stable. As we shall see there was practically no movement of the electorate in terms of right and left blocs, but if we take into account each political organization within the left bloc, there

* The "Croix de Feu" (Crosses of Fire) was a para-military group formed mostly of veterans which had been, for a time, tempted by the Fascist example.

was a deep change in comparison with the 1932 elections.

Table 1.1

Election year (first run)	Right	Left
1932	37.35%	44.48% of registered voters
1936	35.88%	45.94%

Percent of Voters (Right and Left) in the First Run of the 1936 Elections.

Source: Claude Willard, Socialisme et Communisme Français, (Paris: Armand Colin. 1967) p. 125.

Table 1.2

Parties	1932	1936
Socialist	2,034,000	2,206,000
Communist	738,000	1,469,000
Radical	2,315,000	1,745,000

Number of Voters (by Party) in the First Run of the 1936 Elections.

Source: Claude Willard, Socialisme et Communisme, p.127

The SFIO kept its position, the Radical Party (Parti Radical) drew back and the FCP gained 87.5 percent. In other words, inside the left bloc, the French electorate had voted more to the Left. The tactics of a united front had thus been very profitable for the FCP.

In the second run, candidates and voters observed the "republican

discipline" and this explains in part why the Popular Front won the majority of the seats in the National Assembly of 1936.

Table 1.3

Parties	1932	1936	
Communist	11	72	+61
Socialist	131	147	+16
Independent Socialists	37	51	+14
Parti Radical	157	106	-51
Total	490	490	

Number of Seats Won by the Left in the 1936 Elections.

Source: Georges Dupeux, Le Front Populaire et Les Elections de 1936. Cahier de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 99, (Paris: Armand Colin, 1958).

The Communists would not participate in Léon Blum's Government; because they thought that by taking governmental responsibilities, they risked losing their attractive strength among the masses. Moreover, the participation of the Communists in the Government would have been likely to lead to an explosive situation, given the fact that half of the public opinion and the great economic interests did not trust the sudden tactical turn of the FCP. Following the words of Paul Vaillant-Couturier, editor of l'Humanité, the French Communist Party would perform, "from outside the Government, a mass ministry".¹⁷ Thus, the FCP could keep its latitude of action vis a vis the Government. For example, when Blum adopted an attitude of non-intervention with regard to the Civil War in Spain, Communists were free to claim for

"guns for Spain" thus keeping their popularity among French public opinion. The same observation is valid when we consider the reaction of Communists to the financial policy of the "Front Populaire" Government. When in September 1936, Blum was driven to devaluating the Franc, a measure which annihilated in part the increase of most Frenchmen's income which had been conceded after the Matignon agreement,* the FCP did not risk anything by claiming that "the rich must pay".

In fact, the French Communist Party took benefits from the social realizations of the Front Populaire without supporting its burdens. This tactics finally failed because Communists did not participate in the Government thus, they could not influence its evolution either. As soon as the left governmental coalition started its evolution toward the Center-Left and then toward the Center-Right, the action of the Communist Party which was conceived at its origin as a support for the Socialist Government had no valid ground anymore.

The mass ministry has been finally reduced to a hollow orchestration of an immense hope that the members of Parliament and the circumstances have slowly stamped out.¹⁸

The ratification of the Munich agreements (September 1938) to which the FCP alone opposed and the anti-social policy of the Daladier-Reynaud Government gave the final strokes to the Front Populaire.

The Beginning of World War II

The signing of the German-Soviet pact in August 1939 and the entry

* In June 1936, the worker's strike was settled by an agreement signed at the Matignon Palace which increased worker's salary about 13% and which provided for paid vacations (a first for France) and other benefits.

of the Soviet army into Eastern Poland in September contributed further to the rupture between the Communists and the rest of the French political community. The FCP was outlawed in September 1939, after its refusal to condemn Soviet policy. Once again, it seemed that the French Communist Movement had entered a period of isolation from the entire French political community. However, its centralized structure and division into compartmentalized cells helped the Communist Party to stay alive in clandestinity. The clandestine organization of the FCP which was at first a powerful shield against French and German repression soon served for the purpose of an active resistance against Hitlerism. The entry of the Soviet Union in war against Germany (June 22, 1941) led the French Communist Party to become the first organized group of Résistance in metropolitan France.

French Communism in War and Libération

Until 1943, Communists remained outside other Résistance groups. However, in November 1942, a Communist delegate had been sent to London and in May 1943, the Communist Party participated in the creation of the National Center for Resistance (CNR) and for the first time in history two Communist ministers were appointed by General De Gaulle to his Algerian "Comité Français de Libération Nationale". From then on and until 1947, the FCP became a major party which participated in every government. It was also to become the first political organization (in terms of the number of followers) after the Liberation in 1945.

In the legislative election of October 1945, for the first time Socialists and Communists won the majority of parliamentary seats. There was a flow of new adherents for both parties even greater than during the Popular

Front.

Table 1.4

Parties	Number of adherents	
	1937	1946
Communist	291,000	804,000
Socialist	280,000	353,000

Number of Socialist and Communist Adherents in 1946 (Compared to 1937).

Source: Claude Willard, Socialisme et Communisme, p.147

In November 1946, Maurice Thorez claimed for the presidency of the Government on the grounds that his Party was the first party in the Parliament. At the same time, the Secretary General of the FCP opened an entirely new perspective with respect to the problem of the evolution toward socialism.

The progresses of democracy throughout the world... allow us to consider other paths toward socialism than the one followed by Soviet communism. This path is necessarily different according to each country.¹⁹

For many observers, French communism had become reformist. For example, in 1945, Etienne Fajon (a member of the Political Bureau) did not hesitate to call "provocateurs" those who "chatter[ed] about the establishment of socialism in France"²⁰ and Jacques Duclos (a member of the Political Bureau) declared that the nationalization of trade and industry was "merely an old republican demand".²¹ In 1946, the FCP sustained a constitutional project which was characterized by its extreme moderation.

French Communism in the Cold War

The idyll between Communists and the French political community did not last however. In May 1947, the Socialist Paul Ramadier removed the Communist ministers under the pretext that they had publicly denied the social and economic policy of the Government. In fact, the rupture was a sign of the general crisis affecting the Communist Movement as a whole. In the Spring of 1947, Communists were removed from their governmental positions in Italy, Belgium, South America, etc. The Cold War was already in the process of opposing the Communist bloc whose analysis of the international situation was based on Zhdanov's report to the Western bloc, which followed the Marshall plan and the interpretation of the international situation given by President Truman in March 1947.

All French political organizations (including the SFIO) estimated that the peace and freedom of the world was threatened by Soviet imperialism. The contrary held true for French Communists for whom imperialism was represented by the United States who sought to establish their hegemony and prepare a Third World War in order to destroy socialism. The French Communist Party was thus to perform two interrelated tasks. (1) To keep peace in the world by fighting against U.S. imperialism; to this effect was created in Paris the World Movement for Peace in 1947. (2) To engage in the struggle for national independence and denounce the policy of the French Government which was submitting itself to American imperialism.

During more than ten years, the FCP was isolated from the rest of the French political organizations. This isolation increased in 1958, when General De Gaulle came into power and attracted a good proportion of Communist voters.

Table 1.5

Election years	Communist voters....	Seats
January, 1956	5,514,000 25.6%	87
November, 1958	3,882,000 18.9%	10

Communist Votes and Seats in Parliament at the 1958 Elections.

Source: Claude Willard, Socialisme et Communisme, p. 155

Moreover, there was a deepening in the rupture between the FCP and the SFIO. While the former still remained in a fundamental opposition to the Gaullist Government, the SFIO supported General De Gaulle.

The French Communist Party Since 1962

Socialists, however rapidly moved to the opposition against De Gaulle's regime. The Communist Party stabilized its votes after the heavy losses of 1958. Moreover, following the XXth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (1956), a doctrinal renewal occurred within the Party which since 1962 has advocated the doctrine of peaceful transition to socialism and has rejected the doctrine according to which the single party is the necessary condition for the establishment of socialism.

An electoral alliance was drawn between the SFIO and the FCP for the 1962 elections. At the occasion of the presidential election of 1965, Socialists and "Radicaux" (Center-Left) unified within the Democratic and Socialist Federation of the Left (FGDS). The Socialist Federation signed an agreement with the FCP in order to support the candidacy of François Mitterand (Socialist leader) for the presidency of the Republic against

General De Gaulle. They also signed an alliance for the second run of the 1967 elections. At both elections, the power of attraction of the united left manifested itself. At the second run of the presidential election (December 1965) Mitterand won 45% of the votes. At the election of March 1967, the FCP increased its representation in Parliament by 32 seats (from 41 to 73).

The dynamic force that seemed to bring together socialism and communism had been launched. After the interruption of the 1968 elections which followed the "May events",* the discussion between the FCP and the SFIO started again and an agreement was settled between both parties which led to a common political program (June 27, 1972). In the winter of 1973, during the preparation of the legislative elections, the possibility that a leftist majority could be brought up in the National Assembly was seriously envisaged by all political spheres. At the first run of the March 1973 elections, the united left (the Communist, Socialist and Radical Parties) attracted more votes than the majority (Gaullist Party; Independents and part of the Centrists)

Table 1.6

Parties	(first run)		Seats in Parliament 1973
	Percent of votes	1968	
Communist		34	73
Unified Socialist		--	4
Socialist	46.49		91
Radical		57	25

* This refers to the May 1968, student riots and the general strike which took place throughout France.

Table 1.6 (con.)

Parties	Percent of votes	(first run)	Seats in Parliament	
		1973	1968	1973
Center			33	41
Gaullist			293	200
Independent	38.84		61	42
Other			9	11

Percent of Votes and Seats in Parliament (1973).


Source: Le Monde, March 14, 1973

RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE SOVIET AND
THE FRENCH COMMUNIST PARTIES

We have seen that the strategies of the FCP have evolved. This evolution is the result of complex interrelations between the French Communist Movement and its environments (i.e. the French Political System as well as the Soviet Communist Movement). Thus, in order to account fully for the evolution of FCP we have to analyze also the evolution of the International Communist Movement and the relationships between that Movement and the French Party. We will retain the concept of linkage, as originated by James Rosenau.²²

Linkage is a basic unit of analysis defined as "any recurrent sequence of behavior that originates in one system and is reacted to in another".²³ We shall refer to the initial stage of the linkage as an output and to the terminal stage of it as an input. Thus, the particular linkage that interests us and which originates in the system of the International Communist Movement and is reacted to in the system of the FCP, will look like this:

System of the
International
Communist Movement



System of the
French Communist
Party

In order to account fully for the linkages which take place between both systems, we should also mention the linkages originated in the system of the FCP and which are reacted to in the system of the International Communist Movement. In fact, it appears that most linkages that take place between both systems are "fused linkages", that is :

Sequences in which an output fosters an input that in turn fosters an output in such a way that they cannot meaningfully be analyzed separately.²⁴

The priority of the allegiance of the FCP to the International Communist Movement which is the very basis of the existence of the former will make it very likely that the outputs originated in the system of the Communist Movement (and more precisely, by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union) are reinforced by the outputs originated by the French Communist Party. However, we can ask whether the changes that have occurred in the International Communist Movement, the French Political System and the French Communist Party since 1920 have led to the alteration of these fused linkages.

Evolution of the International Communist Movement

The structure of the system of the International Communist Movement has changed since its creation. The initial world Communist Movement has been transformed into a system of structures similar to the international system, of which it is both a sub-system and a counter-system. If we wish to introduce time limits in the evolution of that system, we would distinguish the following time periods:

The Third International (1919-1943) was a centralized world party constituted of local Communist parties which were required for mutual support in the world proletarian struggle.

The period of direct Soviet administration (1943-1947) which followed the dissolution of the Communist International did not yield an emancipation of local Communist parties. On the contrary, if the Comintern and other international Communist organizations did not exist any more after 1943, their functions were not suppressed but transferred directly to the Central Committee of the CPSU. As Annie Kriegel put it:

As an adaptative measure to the new conditions created by the war, the dissolution of the Third International yielded to a certain kind of allegiance over all less contractual than the previous one... It is at that date and during that period that one can speak of Stalinist parties: a party which is a province, a colony in the ancient sense of the empire of which Stalin is the Caesar.²⁵

The International Communist Movement was a de facto world party until the end of World War II and the establishment of Communist regimes in Eastern Europe. Since that time, while having still the attributes for becoming universal, it has become a partial international system. This system was described in the fifties under the name of the "Communist bloc".

The linkages between the International Communist Movement and the French Communist Party during the Cominform decenny (1947-1956) cannot be analyzed without mentioning the context of the Cold War that developed in that period. Most of the local Communist parties, situated in a hostile environment, while less submissive to the CPSU than during the previous periods distinguished themselves by a remarkable faithfulness to the Soviet directives.

Since the death of Stalin however, the International Communist Movement with its economic and geographical cleavages, its diplomatic conflicts

and spheres of influence, has shown more and more clearly the characteristics of a standard international system. The international character of the Communist system is accounted for by the establishment of the People's Republic of China (1949) and the development of the Sino-Soviet schism which has become an undoubted and stable fact in that system. Moreover, following the XXth CPSU Congress of 1956 and the de-stalinization undertaken by Khrushchev the formerly preponderant influence of the Soviet Union has been reduced, yielding to a greater autonomy of other members of the Communist system.

Whereas several members have contested the right to an exclusive control of the leadership position by either Soviet or Chinese parties, the development of the Sino-Soviet dispute has led many observers to see the growth of regional sub-systems in Europe and in Asia, based on the Soviet Union and China respectively and to abandon the concept of "Socialist bloc" for a twofold classification.

Since we follow this interpretation, we need to make a distinction between at least two and perhaps three sub-systems within the broad system of International communism. (1) The "dominant" system which would be the Soviet sphere of influence from the perspective of the French Party and most European Communist parties and states; (2) the "competitive" system or Chinese obedience from the same perspective would represent the dominant system in Albania for example. A third sub-system would be represented by those Communist parties that contest both Soviet and Chinese supremacy.

Fused Linkages

The transformation of the International Communist Movement into a standard international system has led to the deterioration of the fused link-

ages observed between the FCP and the CPSU. The first obstacle to fused linkages refers to the phenomena of delay in reactions which is observable for example, in the response of the French Communist Party to the new outputs originated by the Congress of the CPSU in 1956. It is not until 1962 (and perhaps 1964, the date when Waldeck-Rochet came to the direction of the FCP after the death of Maurice Thorez) that the French Party responded to the perturbation which spread gradually to the other partners of the Communist system.

According to the principle of "proletarian internationalism", all Communist parties have the obligation of defending the interests of the International Communist Movement. However, it seems necessary to consider that the interests of that Movement seen as a standard international system, do not seem more obvious or apparent than say, those of the Western sphere of influence. When both American and Soviet great powers negotiate in every direction and when the problem of peace and war that dominated the sixties seems to give place everywhere to complex domestic problems, it is "inevitable that the policy of local Communist parties is no more exclusively drawn by their role in the safeguard of the Socialist camps's interests".²⁶ In other terms, the absolute priority devolving upon the solidarity with the Socialist camp, at the time where peaceful coexistence has succeeded to Cold War and where Communist ideology seems to be influenced in the first place by national considerations, does not seem to be justified anymore.

Another alteration of fused linkages between the FCP and the CPSU lies in the hazy character of the Soviet model for French Communists. If the Soviet Revolution and regime still represent a privileged path toward socialism for the FCP, French Communists are ready to admit that the existing

Soviet society reveals certain imperfections even if their critique remains limited and prudent.


The last obstacle refers to the contiguousness of the French Communist Party with the French national reality. As we will see, the FCP is financially self-sufficient; its strength and stability do not seem to be related to the fortunes of the CPSU either. But above all, after more than fifty years of existence and given its electoral strength, we could not underestimate the cultural proximity that ties the Communist Party to the French Political System. Is it possible then to assert that the FCP has become totally integrated in the French Political System? In other terms, is the FCP a national Communist party? The answer is clearly no. We think first that a national Communist party is not automatically integrated in its political system and, in the second place, the FCP cannot be considered as a national Communist party because it still entertains privileged relationships with the Soviet Union. Indeed, in spite of recent deteriorations, fused linkages still are predominant in the relationships between the French Party and the Soviet Communist Movement.

In a fused linkage process, information and behavior flow in a loop relating two systems, just as information and behavior flow through a feedback loop within a system. There is more than a similarity between what James Rosenau calls "fused linkage" and Karl Deutsch's concept of "amplifying feedback"²⁷ In international politics, it seems that fused linkage would be the basic pattern of escalation between two systems of equal strength; this would be the case for example of two great powers engaged in an arms race or an ideological struggle. By contrast, fused linkages between the French Communist Party and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union would hardly lead to any process of escalation since the CPSU

originates much more outputs than the FCP.

We could thus contrast two cases. In the first case, (linkages between China and the Soviet Union) an output fosters an input which in turn fosters an output that will add about the same amount of information to the first output in every cycle, without neither part being able to slow down the process. The effect will be described by drawing an exponential curve starting slowly and then taking off (graph 1). In the second case, an output fosters an input which in turn fosters an output that will add information in the cycle (amplifying effect) until the increment declines as the result of an authoritative decision by one partner (graph 2). The first graph would fit the linkage process between China and the Soviet Union in the past fifteen years, with the Chinese Communist Party continuously reinforcing the outputs initiated by the CPSU and the result being an escalating competition for ideological hegemony.

Figure 1.1



Fused Linkage Process: Exponential and Logistic Curves.

The second graph would fit the fused linkage process that took place in the relationships between the French Communist Party and the Soviet Communist Party. Several outputs originated by the Soviet Communist Party after 1956 have been reacted to in the FCP in such a way that they formed fused linkages.

The de-stalinization undertaken by Khrushchev was an attempt to question the Stalinist structure of relationships within the International Communist Movement and to reexamine the general relations of the Movement with the non-Communist world. After 1962, the French Communist Party undertook a similar search for the new formulation of the nature and devices of the International Communist system.

The doctrine of peaceful coexistence represents a strategic change aiming at the rejection in practice and in theory of war and economic crisis as the standard path toward the Revolution at the world level. This doctrine assumes that the world extension of socialism is not worth the risk of war, at least in those countries which are protected by the world atomic strategy. This principle has been integrated in the doctrine of the FCP under the name of "peaceful transition to socialism". Waldeck-Rochet has explained this principle.

As far as France is concerned, no one can say with precision how socialism will be realized tomorrow. However, the will and expectation of the French Communist Party are clear: all the activity of the Party is directed toward the creation of conditions favorable to a peaceful transition to socialism.²⁸

In relation to the Sino-Soviet split, the French Communist Party had publicly proposed the creation of an International Conference of Communist parties in 1963. It was difficult to know at that time whether the French idea was to condemn the Chinese adventure and reassess the "leadership role of the CPSU" or on the contrary, to claim for the

independence and equality of all Communist parties. In fact, it is the second interpretation that the FCP has sustained. At the preparatory Conference of Budapest in March 1968, Georges Marchais, Deputy Secretary General of the FCP made the statement that "there is and there should not be dominant and subordinate parties"²⁹

However, the same year, the process of normalization started, by which the Soviet Union signified to its partners that they had been too far on the path of polycentrism and liberalization. The normalization started by the intervention in Czechoslovakia (August 1968) to which the French Party reacted in the following manner:

Surprise and reprobation (August, 21)

Regret and disapproval (August, 22)

Divergence and disagreement (September 1968)

Moreover, the intervention in itself was not disapproved; what made it a question for French Communist officials was the military form of the normalization. The disagreement never reached the fundamental question of the solidarity between Communist parties³⁰

The French Communist Party seems to be willing to keep intact above all the privileged character of its relations with the CPSU. Thus, Roger Garaudy, once official thinker of the FCP, who had denounced the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia (CTK interview) has been publicly disavowed by the leadership of his Party (August, 27, 1968) and later expelled from the Political Bureau and the Party. Finally, it seems that the normalization has also been extended to the French Communist Party through the "elimination" of Waldeck-Rochet and his replacement by Georges Marchais.

THE NATURE OF THE FRENCH COMMUNIST PARTY

The strategy of the French Communist Party as well as its relationships with the CPSU have evolved. However, neither the strategic evolution nor the changes in the relations with the CPSU have influenced the fundamental exteriority of the French Communist Party from the French Political System. One apparent reason for the ambivalence of the FCP which is both outside and within the French Political System seems to reside in the specific ties that exist between the French Communist leadership and the Soviet Communist Party. However, this explanation is not sufficient. Or rather, we have to ask why contrary to Social Democratic parties, the FCP remains faithful to the principles of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine and consequently, to the CPSU. A Christian Democrat organization such as the Italian CDP or the French MRP is "inside" its political system in spite of privileged links with the Catholic Church. The fundamental reason for the exteriority of the FCP lies above all in its structure and ideology.

The implication of the mutation through which the FCP developed during its bolshevization are considerable. This bolshevization has had as a consequence the erection of two obstacles. These were two locks whose purpose were to forbid the integration of the French working class from the interplay of the French established power and society. The task lasted for ten years but it has been a durable success. In fact, fifty years later, these obstacles still remain. These are structural obstacles in the first place which stem from the fundamental aspects of the Communist Party's organization: the existence of a stable core of permanent party leaders and cadres and the strict application of the principle of "democratic

centralism". There are ideological obstacles in the second place, which are based on the world revolutionary dimension of the Communist Movement and on the nature of the post-revolutionary power; in Lenin's words, the principles of "proletarian internationalism" and "dictatorship of the proletariat"

Structural Obstacles to Integration

The "permanents" who compose the French Party's apparatus are to the Communist militants what the Clergy is to the Christian people. The demarcation line between permanent cadres and other militants or mere followers is not only a material boundary separating the common followers from those individuals who devote all their time to the Party; it is also and above all a spiritual boundary separating men who have "cut all the bridges" with the profane world from men who still live in this world. In becoming permanent cadre, the Communist militant leaves the world of the office and of the enterprise to enter the closed world of the Party which possesses its proper norms and values, its proper hierarchy that differs totally from the hierarchy of the outside world. There is a specific "cursus honorum" which must be followed by anyone top permanent cadre of the Communist Party.³¹

The apparatus of the Party, conceived as a separate corps of "permanents" will thus play a role of stabilizer in the Communist Party. By folding itself and giving no hold to the outside world, the French Communist apparatus is a regulatory device for the Party's behavior.

During defensive periods, the apparatus becomes a closed society which gives no hold to adversity. During offensive periods, on the contrary it constitutes an important reserve in which one can extract cadres in order to surround the masses.³²

Moreover, the French Communist Party's apparatus has a function of guardian and keeper of the Communist tradition.

The second variable refers to democratic centralism. This principle requires two conditions in order to function; unity and discipline.

It is in the name of these principles that factional deviations from the party line are denounced when they question the decisions of the party leadership. Maurice Thorez has explained clearly the principle:

Our Communist Party could not be conceived outside unity, total unity of action of all the members of the Party... What the Party does not allow, what it rejects as non-compatible with the principle of unity is the organization of tendencies, groups or factions that would lead to the formation of several leadership centers and consequently to the laxity in discipline, to division and finally, to the desintegration of the Party.³³

The problem of understanding the notion of Communist discipline has always divided its partisans and adversaries who offer two opposing explanations for it. The former emphasize the role of general agreement on revolutionary values. In this view, by discipline, one means exalting devotion to certain goals and values. The latter's interpretation emphasizes the role of coercion and constraint to hold the organization together. In that sense, Communist discipline is seen as blind submission of robotized militants. In fact, both interpretations rest on two different interpretations of democracy. In the traditional conception, freedom is "coextensive" with human nature; it possesses an undeniable value for the present which causes that it must be respected in any situation. According to this conception of democracy, one cannot pretend to serve freedom, even in the future, by negating it in the present. On the contrary, the Marxist conception of democracy conceives freedom as a conquest, a future Man cannot consider he is free until he has broken the chains of the existing Capitalist society within which freedom is only an illusion. In his novel Drôle de Jeu, Roger Vaillant explains in the following terms this conception

Figure 1.2

Apparatus ————— Organization —————

Central Commission
Composed of members of
the Central Committee,
representatives and
leaders of mass-
organizations.



Political Sections
Composed by
permanent cadres.

Section for trade-unionism

Ideological section
(Press, Propaganda,
Education...)

Section for mass-
organizations

.....

General Secretariat
Political Bureau
Elected by the
Central Committee.

Federal Secretariat
Elected by the
Federal Committee.

Secretariat of
Section
Elected by the
Section Committee.

Central Committee
Elected by the
National Congress.



Federal Committee
Elected by the
Federal Conference.



Committee of Section
Elected by the
Conference of Section.



Cells (urban, rural
enterprise).

National Congress
Composed by delegates
elected by the
Federal Conference.



Federal Conference
Composed by delegates
elected by the
Conference of Section.



Conference of Section
Composed by delegates
elected by Cells.



Cell Assembly

Diagram of the Organization of the French Communist Party Since World War II.

of freedom.

Communism to a certain extent gives up freedom of choice and submits itself to discipline because this discipline is necessary for efficiency of action and in the present stage of the class struggle, efficiency must transcend everything else.³⁴

Ideological Obstacles

In this, we refer to both principles of "proletarian internationalism" and "dictatorship of the proletariat" according to which the working class, with the help of Communist movements will overthrow the bourgeois order at the world level. Each Communist militant is expected to adhere totally to these elements of the Communist doctrine. According to a good witness who belonged to the French Communist Party for several years,

There is in each Communist militant a kind of hidden truth that cannot be understood by the profane. This self-reassuring belief allows him to erase easily any political doubt, because he possesses the truth and the strength.³⁵

The Communist militant knows that he possesses the truth and that the inevitable evolution of those who are not Communist yet (and especially the followers of Social Democratic organizations) will be toward communism.

Chapter 2

VALIDITY OF SYSTEMS APPROACH

The purpose of the following analysis is not to provide a complete statement of the theory and implications of Eastonian systems analysis, for since the time this theory was originated many criticisms have been leveled referring principally to the lack of testable hypotheses in systems analysis as an empirical theory. Rather, we will deal with the validity of systems theory as applied to a particular item; the French Communist Party (FCP).

APPLICATION OF EASTON'S FRAMEWORK TO THE
FRENCH COMMUNIST PARTY: METHODOLOGY

David Easton has suggested that political life should be viewed as a "system of behavior embedded in an environment to the influences of which the political system itself is exposed and in turn reacts".¹ Several considerations are implicit in this interpretation and it is necessary to retrace some of them. Furthermore, the application of systems analysis to a political party such as the French Communist Party raises several methodological problems that must be carefully pointed out.

Systems Analysis in Comparative Political Study

Easton's analysis rests on the following premises:

- (1) Systems analysis starts with the consideration of the vitality and the capacity of political systems to respond to disturbances. In spite of the stress to which they are exposed almost all systems succeed in perpetuating themselves and performing specific functions. Under systems analysis structures are not considered as essential; rather than a frame around which everything is articulated, structures constitute means for the disposal of the political system and are subject to modification or disappearance. In other words, systems analysis stresses the fundamental processes of political life rather than the structural aspects of it which are merely "mortal configurations" of a political system.
- (2) A system is defined as "any set of variables, regardless of the degree of interrelationship among them".² A political system is designated

as "those interactions through which values are authoritatively allocated for a society".³ This is what distinguishes a political system from other social systems that may be interpreted as lying in its environment.

To understand the nature and the interplay of those political interactions, the following two essential points must be stressed.

(3) If there is a specific field of politics the model of political interactions is not unique. All social systems are composed of interpersonal interactions of which the political system is only one particular aspect. Political life forms an "open system" which cannot be interpreted as existing in a void. It must be seen as surrounded by a social, psychological or physical environment.

(4) In order to survive, political systems must have the capacity to respond to stress from the environment. The capacity of a system to respond effectively to stress is derived from the central process of feedback whereby information with respect to the preceding actions of the authorities is put into the system again.

If we associate both characteristics, we can broaden our perspective. The political system is not only conceived as a system of behavior (that is a system of social interrelations that follows the pattern of other social systems), it can also be compared to all systems which accumulate mechanisms of self-regulation, as in biology for example. It is a matter of analogy rather than homology but this analogy allows borrowing of conceptual tools from biology and the application of them to the general pattern of systems analysis.

Patterns of Analysis

The effects that are transmitted across the boundaries of the system

toward some other system are the "outputs of the first system and the "inputs" of the second system (the one they influence). A "feedback loop" will permit the regulation of the system.

There are two basic kinds of inputs: demands and supports. Demands are made by persons or groups in the society that cannot be fully satisfied. Supports are defined as supportive behavior which are understood as either actions promoting goals or a state of mind. Supports are fed into the political system in relation to three basic political objects: the community, the regime and the authorities.

The question Easton regards as fundamental is: how do systems persist? With this question in mind he writes:

Persistence depends upon the maintenance of a minimum level of attachment for each of the three identified political objects. Where the input of support falls below this minimum, the persistence of any kind of system will be endangered.⁴

Supports are generated by the satisfaction members of the system feel when their demands have been met. System's response to these existing or anticipated demands are called "outputs". No political system can meet all of its member's demands all of the time but a certain proportion of the demands must be met by the authorities otherwise system support, built up through previous outputs, would decline. Furthermore, demands may impose stress on the system (input overload). The capacity of a system to respond effectively to stress is derived from the process of feedback, that is, information about the state of the system which is communicated back to the authorities. Feedback is critical to system persistence because it allows the authorities to respond to stress and to demands by modifying previous decisions.

Analytical Character of the Political System

Easton emphasizes the analytical character of systems by stating that "all systems are constructs of the mind".⁵ The boundary of the system (that is, the delimitation between the system under study and other social systems) has no physical reality. It is the task of the researcher to define the elements that will be included or excluded from his analysis. Political systems are analytical constructs yet in another way. They involve an abstraction of the political from the reality. In this sense, a political system is conceived as being made up of "roles" rather than individuals. Role is conceptualized as "that organized sector of an actor's orientation which constitutes and defines his participation in an interactive process."⁶

Definition of the System of the French Communist Party

Easton's framework is an analytical simplification of the reality which allows us to study the relationships between a para-political system (the FCP) and its environment. We will consider that the environment of the FCP is composed of (1) the French Political System and, (2) the system of the International Communist Movement. In order to provide a precise definition of the FCP system, we will have to distinguish as clearly as possible the elements which constitute that particular system from those of both the other systems. We can define the French Communist System in relation to its structural elements (community, regime and authorities) and also to the values that are allocated by this system. However, before we start this investigation, the following important observation must be made.

The FCP as a Para-Political System

Easton writes that there is no absolute prohibition "against adopting an interpretation of politics that would permit us to discover political systems in all other social groups in addition to society itself".⁷ However, there are significant differences between "societal" political systems and less inclusive systems of groups or organizations. However similar the processes and structures of para-political systems may be to the societal political system, when attempting to analyze a societal system (French Political System) or international system (International Communist System) we face the task of isolating the political from the social, the cultural from the economical. In the case of a para-political system, the task is further complicated for it is necessary here to also distinguish these elements which constitute the particular para-system under study from the political elements of the societal system. In the case of the FCP which is considered as a para-political system, we will have to make such a distinction with respect to both systems that constitute its environment.⁸

The Structural Components of the FCP

According to Easton, the regime represents "relatively stable expectations depending on the system and its state of change with regard to the range of matters that can be handled politically, the rules or norms governing the way these matters are processed and the position of those through whom binding actions may be taken on the matters."⁹ As depicted on Easton's diagram, the regime is represented by the arrow of "conversion of demands." However, it covers more than the path followed by demands directed toward

the authorities. The concept of regime determines also the nature and the extent of these demands, the range and the type of possible responses. In other words, the regime refers to the range of political matters in a society.

There seems to be no difficulty in defining the three components of the regime as proposed by Easton. Values correspond to the Marxist-Leninist theory or "ideology"¹⁰ further specified in the line of action determined at each Congress of the Party. The structures of authority are the leadership means within the FCP which are: the Central Committee, the Political Bureau and the Secretariat at the national level.¹¹ Finally, the norms refer in Easton's words to "the kinds of procedures that are expected and acceptable in the processing and implementation of demands".¹² Concretely, the Communist norms present three distinctive aspects. First, the basic unit of the Party's organization is the "cellule d'entreprise" (industrial cell) rather than the local community in order for the Party to retain its specifically working-class clientèle. Second, the principle of "democratic centralism" and third a stable core of "permanents".

All social institutions possess norms and "establishments". Accordingly the FCP does not escape from this rule. There is a strictly defined hierarchy within the FCP which is an essential aspect of the Party as a "counter-society". Different material or moral privileges are attributed according to rank. The Party respects the "etiquette" which is the sign of power in the Communist order, "an order that is not the bourgeois order... but, still an order or to use a term favored by Communists, a legality, the legality of the Party, distinct from the legality of the state but still a specific and coercive legality".¹³

If applied to the FCP system, the concept of community offers an

interesting and complex realm of inquiry. The political community refers in Easton's words to "that aspect of a political system that consists of its members seen as a group of persons bound together by a common division of political labor."¹⁴ The main function of the political community is the conversion of wants into demands and supports.

The political community of the FCP system is obviously composed of the members of the Party. They are formally tied to it and they participate intensely, at least according to the Party's statutes. A further question would be whether to include or not the Party's voters in this community. If we choose as does Georges Lavau in his article A la Recherche d'un Cadre Théorique Pour l'Etude du Parti Communiste Français,¹⁵ to include the voters in a large conception of the political community, we would encounter an apparently unsurmountable difficulty, that is, to isolate in the behavior of the members of such a community that which would make them at a particular time members of the FCP political community and at another time members of the French Political System's community. Thus, it seems justified here (at least for analytical purposes) to distinguish clearly the Communist voters who are part of the French political community from the members of the FCP who are part of the French Communist political community.¹⁶

The same distinction can be made with respect to the foreign delegates sent by the International's Executive Committee before World War II with the task of surveying and pushing ahead the French Party's activity. Such delegates as A. Guralsky (Lepetit), Fried (Clément) or E. Gerö, cannot be included in the FCP political community and must be regarded as members of the International Communist System.

If we follow Easton the authorities would include the occupants of the authority roles. It is clear that the authorities will change periodically

while the authority roles may endure for generations. This is precisely why they need to be distinguished from the structures of authority, which are part of the regime. However, there are individuals who do not occupy authority roles in the FCP but cannot be placed in its political community either; we refer to parallel authorities such as Communist deputies, senators or ministers (in the period 1943-1937). These individuals will be placed in the authorities of the French Political System, given the fact that they are primarily occupants of authority roles in that system.

Authoritative Allocation of Values by the FCP

We can also define the FCP in relation to the values that are allocated by this para-system. Under this perspective, Easton considers a para-political system as a sub-system of and, consequently, holding a lower level of responsibility than the societal political system which in turn is considered as a sub-system of the society. Herbert Spiro has criticized this narrow view of the political system that "mistakes the greater for the lesser, the more encompassing for the less encompassing..."¹⁷ Indeed, many political systems should be viewed as more encompassing than their social environment, for their goal is to transform by means of deliberate political action the social system.

The same can be said about the FCP in the interrelations with its societal political system, since its deliberate purpose and goal is to change the whole society. Thus, rather than conceptualizing the FCP as a sub-system nested in the French Political System which in turn is conceived as a sub-system of the entire French society, we should consider that the French Communist Party and the French Political System are two "independent" systems both attempting to shape and transform the French society with different goals and means.


Thus, we will adopt a large delimitation of the values allocated by the FCP including such domains as "ideology", local politics in those communes where the Party holds all or part of the municipal offices and employment through industrial or commercial firms that the Party controls or possesses.¹⁸

Evaluation of Easton's Framework

To provide referents for the structural components of the system of the French Communist Party is only a first step. This exercise does not have much meaning in itself except for showing the overwhelming importance of the authorities and the bureaucratic apparatus upon all the structural components and also the similarities that exist from one Communist Party to the other in the distribution of these components. The second and most important step is to evaluate the usefulness of Easton's scheme in analyzing the interactions between the FCP and both the French Political System and the International Communist System.

The unusual importance of the authorities (and authority roles) within the FCP system seems to upset the functions assigned by Easton to the structural components of the system. This appears clearly when we try to apply Easton's dynamic response model to the case of the FCP. (see figure 2.1) Easton's dynamic response model is the representation of one aspect of political processes that is, the mechanisms of response to the demands and transformations of the environment. This is the aspect of the political process that interests us here. In Easton's scheme, the demands presenting themselves for political settlement are conceived as external variables, influencing the system at one single level of entry, that is, the political community.

Figure 2.1



A Dynamic Response Model of a Political System

Source: David Easton. A Systems Analysis of Political Life, (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1965), p. 30

Furthermore, they are supposed to concern only the indistinguishable economic, social or cultural wants. In other terms, the path followed by the demands is depicted by Easton as follows:


environment----->community----->authorities

In the case of the FCP, most demands do not originate in the environment but, at the level of the authorities themselves. If Easton explicitly refers to these cases where demands occur within the system as "withinputs"¹⁹ these cases are expected to constitute exceptional events rather than recurrent patterns. Moreover, the rest of the demands which originate in the environment of the FCP do not follow the standard Eastonian path but, rather, they are (at least most of them) experienced directly by the authorities.

We could conceive three types of inputs in the case of the FCP system (1) the withinputs originated in the FCP itself and primarily by the authorities of that system. (2) The indistinguishable wants originated in the environment (and primarily by the French Political System). (3) Specific political demands originated in the environment (primarily by the International Communist System) and influencing the FCP at the level of the authorities. (See figure 2.2.) This classification of inputs would have the merit of emphasizing the authorities of the FCP who occupy numerous roles within their system. Conversely, the political community of the FCP would be conceived more as a sustaining element than as a primary source of demands and supports.

These considerations lead us to ask whether the conceptual framework of Easton would be the appropriate one for the study of the interrelations between the FCP and its environment. According to Easton, the pattern of analysis of a political system involves the examination of the following

Figure 2.2



Inputs of Demands and Supports in the FCP System

variables:

First, the nature of the inputs; second, the variable conditions under which they will constitute a stressful disturbance on the system; third, the environmental and systemic conditions that generate such stressful conditions; fourth, the typical way in which systems have sought to cope with stress; fifth, the role of information feedback and finally, sixth, the part that outputs play in this conversion and coping processes.²⁰

We have seen that Easton's main concern is with the persistence and stability of systems in the face of stress. If a system is to survive it must have the capacity to cope effectively with disturbances either from the environment or from within the system. Systems analysis however, would lead us to consider political parties, in their activities, their functioning as well as their structure as dependent variables, that is, merely as response to the environment. Easton's framework does not take into account the fact that a party can have its own finalities and goal, stemming from its ideology and this seems especially true if we consider the case of the French Communist Party. Of course, a great deal of the functioning of the FCP can be explained by its interactions with the environment, but, on the other hand, there seems to be another dimension which is a dimension of "non-participation" between the French Party and its environment.

We have seen there are three types of inputs in the case of the FCP, inputs from the International Communist System, inputs from the French Political System and finally, withinputs originated by the authorities of the French Party itself which represent the non-participation dimension of the Party. Therefore, we will consider that only the inputs from both environments of the French Communist Party can represent stressful disturbances for the Party.


Here seems to lie the fundamental shortcoming of systems analysis as applied to such a party as the FCP. Annie Kriegel has suggested that the

application of such analytical framework to the Communist phenomena does not provide a full light or operational capacity in the understanding of this phenomena:

Theories built in order to explain political parties (and especially those elaborated by American political scientists who are used to thinking of a system where revolutionary conflicts have never been yet incarnated in a lasting transnational structure) provide useful concepts for the investigation of Communist parties but, only for what they have in common with other parties, whatever they are and, that is in short, for their less specific aspects. [These theories] do not account for the "alienness" of Communist parties. Therefore, their application to the French case leads more or less consciously to reduce 'a priori' this "difference", this remainder whose existence is however recognized in the common language when one says that a Communist party "is not like other parties".²¹

The best way of depicting the interrelations between the FCP, the French Political System and the system of the International Communist Movement would be to conceive these three systems as independent from one another.

Figure 2.3



Interrelations Between Three Independent Systems

However, "any reflection about the FCP should be a reflection at two levels"²² that is, we have to distinguish between two states of the same phenomena, that is, between the two poles within the FCP.

The level of the first pole is where the Communist Party is in contact (and in conflict) with its environments, in other words, the French Political System and the International Communist System. This contact can take a variety of forms. We can distinguish (1) the class against class tactics (1924-1934 in the FCP history); (2) the anti-Fascist strategy leading to the tactics of the "union of the Left" during the Popular Front of 1936-1937 and in a more proximate context, the new "union of the Left" tactics corresponding to the strategy of detente. (3) Finally, there is the Cold War strategy (1947-1956). These are the strategies which have successively determined the concrete interrelations between the Communist world and the French established society; but a deeper observation would permit us to distinguish many more situations from total exteriority to more or less complete interpenetration.

At the opposite of this pole of the presence to the real world, there is the hidden pole which is also in Annie Kriegel's words a "non-varying pole, prefiguring the future and representing the aspiration to a perfect society".²³ This pole rests upon the Soviet Communist model and is accounted for by the fact that a Communist party represents a revolutionary power, the revolutionary power, totally different from the established power.

However, it is necessary to explain in more detail what we mean by Revolution here. For a Communist, one does not make the Revolution, the Revolution occurs. Revolution is a rational process, assigned by history unavoidable and as such, it is impossible to escape it. However, neither

the working class, nor the oppressed can initiate the Revolution alone. This role belongs to the Communist Party which must be considered as an instrument of historical necessity.

In systemic terms, we would consider change in the FCP as the consequence of a stress threatening the Party's capacity to persist in its nature of revolutionary party in a "Capitalist" environment. All Communist parties in Western Europe have participated in a "bourgeois" government in one way or another. This does not mean however, that they have changed. We have to distinguish between two kinds of system change. Morton Kaplan²⁴ points out that there is a difference between (1) the case where a system behaves differently because of an environmental disturbance but returns to its old behavior when the disturbance is removed and, (2) the case where the changed behavior persists even after the disturbance is removed.

According to Annie Kriegel's interpretation, environmental disturbances have only affected the state of the system but the system itself has not changed. The FCP follows the strategic model, set up by the International Communist Movement at the time of the Popular Front strategy and further improved after World War II, according to which a Communist party is situated both within and outside the "bourgeois" system. Under this perspective, the participation of a Communist party in the bourgeois power necessarily coexists with the "obstinate preservation of the total exteriority"²⁵ of this party from its societal environment. If this interpretation is correct, the functioning of the French Communist System can be represented as follows:

Change is introduced by the pole regarding the external world.
But, it is assimilated only if it is compatible with the components of the other pole which do not vary.²⁶

To put this statement in a hypothetical form :

Hypothesis: The persistence of the system of the FCP rests on its capacity to filter the innovations which are in conformity with its very nature.

THE FRENCH COMMUNIST PARTY'S RESPONSE TO DEMANDS
AND SUPPORTS FROM THE FRENCH POLITICAL SYSTEM

The main purpose of Easton's framework is to explain how a political system faces stress that threaten its persistence and ultimately, how that system will change under stressful conditions. For Easton, the process whereby a system faces stress follows this pattern:

- transmission of inputs to the system
- conversion of these inputs into outputs by the authorities of that system
- retroaction of these decisions and actions upon the environment

The stresses that threaten a system are caused either by an overload of demands with regard to the capacity of response of that system or by a deficiency of supports. Thus, if the retroaction process upon the environment is effective, the environment or the system will be modified in such a way that the load of demands directed toward the system will be relieved and the volume of the supports will be increased.

To what extent could these inputs from the environment of the French Communist Party take the form of stressful disturbances for its persistence? The analysis of the inputs from the French Political System will show that these inputs can hardly be considered as stressful disturbances for the persistence of the French Communist Party because, as we will see, the authorities of the French Party define what type of demands and supports will be admitted in its system. Thus, our hypothesis will be the following: the system of the FCP is secure from either an overload of demands or a deficiency of supports.

Supports

A first issue would be the dependence of the Communist Party on the appeal not only of its members for support but also to voters and sympathizers. In other terms, what are the effects of attempts to broaden the base of supports for the FCP? Furthermore, we will see that the FCP has emphasized several times in its history a "united front" policy. As Richard Cornell points out, "of importance is not only the forces impelling [Communist] parties to emphasize these policies but, as well, the effect that these policies might have on the opportunities of the Party to change in the future to other policies"²⁸ In other words, did changes in the FCP occur from a workable "united front" policy? Especially, with regard to the recent emphasis upon this type of policy, we can ask whether there can remain possibilities for a return by the French Communist Party to a more seclusive policy.

Communist Vote

A large majority of Communist voters seem relatively insensitive to the concrete results of the party policy. This seems to be explained by the class character of the French Communist vote which has been more stable in the period 1945-1973 than any other vote. Table 2.1 shows that between the minimum level of electoral success for French communism in 1958 and the maximum level in 1946, the ratio is 1 to 1.5. The same ratio for other political parties in the same time period (1945-1973) is:

Socialist Party	1 to 2.1
Radical Party	1 to 2.1

Table 2.1

Elections	Communist Vote %		Votes for other parties %				
			SFIO	Radical	MRP	Moderes	Gaullist
Oct. 1945	5 005 336	20.3	18.2	8.1	18.6	12.1	
Jun. 1946	5 119 111	20.7	16.9	9.3	22.6	10.2	
Nov. 1946	5 489 288	21.9	13.7	8.5	19.9	9.9	2.3
Jun. 1951	5 056 605	20.6	11.1	7.6	9.8	10.8	16.5
Jan. 1956	5 514 603	20.5	12.1	12.4	8.8	12.2	3.0
Nov. 1958	3 907 653	14.3	11.7	5.5	8.3	16.5	15.2
Mar. 1962	4 003 763	14.5	8.4	5.0	5.9	6.3	24.0
Mar. 1967	5 029 808	17.8		14.9		10.1	30.0
Jun. 1968	4 435 357	15.7		12.9		8.1	34.2
Mar. 1973	5 156 619	17.5	17.8				22.0

Vote (percent) in Parliamentary Elections

Sources: Jean Ranger, "Evolution du Vote Communiste Depuis 1945", Le Communisme en France, Cahier de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 175, (Paris: Armand Colin, 1969), p. 212.
Le Monde, March 16, 1973.

Table 2.2

Polls	Parties				
	PCF	SFIO	Radical	MRP	Moderes
February 1946	91	71	74	70	70
May 1946	92	77	79	66	79
January 1947	87	92	69	71	71
June 1947	89	75	72	78	72
December 1947	89	69	61	64	61
February 1948	85	74	52	40	19
March 1949	82	74	66	46	43
October 1949	80	66	65	41	37
April 1951	81	70	61	39	46
August 1953	95	77	72	41	82
November 1956	68	80	49	66	77
March 1957	81	82	60	80	76
January 1958	84	67	56	62	73

Percent of Voters Who Have the Intention of Voting for the Same Party
From One Election to the Next, (1946-1958)

Source: Jean Ranger, "Le Vote Communiste", p. 216.

Moderes (Right) 1 to 2.6

Gaullist Party 1 to 11.4

By using the method of "ranking correlation", Jean Ranger has compared the distribution of a sample of French "departements" according to Communist vote since 1946. His conclusion was that:

From one election to the other, the correlation coefficient shows a very strong adjustment: between the 1951 and the 1956 elections, the ranking correlation coefficient (r) is 0.94; between 1962 and 1967, it is 0.93. For the entire period under study, r equals 0.77.²⁹

The investigation of intentions of vote by means of opinion polls verifies this general stability of Communist vote at the individual level. Table 2.2 shows results of IFOP^{**} public opinion polls for the time period 1946-1958. Except for 1956, there has never been more than one out of five Communist voters to express the intention of changing his vote from one election to the next.

In table three, we observe that this individual stability of Communist vote is also valid for the Fifth Republic.

Table 2.3

Parties	Faithful Voters	Toward Abstention	Toward Other Parties
Communist	85	7	8
Gaullist	68	10	22
Socialist	61.5	5.5	33
Radical	52.2	11	35
Christian Demo.	44	9.5	46.5
Independents	40	14.5	45

Vote Transfer From 1958 to 1962.

Source: Jean Ranger, "Le Vote Communiste", p. 218.

^{**} Institut Français de l'Opinion Publique.

A public opinion poll³⁰ conducted in 1966 by IFOP allows us to evaluate the relationship between Communist vote and (1) the identification with a social class, (2) the importance of social and economic motivations and, (3) the image of the French Communist Party in terms of economic and social action. The IFOP poll shows that 61 percent of the respondents in the sample (composed of 75 percent of Communist voters) identified with a social class. 66 percent of the Communist voters in the sample who identified with a social class declared that they belonged to the working class. The percent of Socialist voters in the sample who shared that feeling was 26% and the same proportion for Gaullist voters was 18%. To the question: "When you vote for a deputy, to what aspect do you attach most importance?", 45 percent of Communist voters answered that they attached more importance to the "standard of living of most of the people".

The resulting image of the French Communist Party is that it is seen above all as a class party. 41 percent of the sample estimate that the FCP is primarily "the Party of the workers". (63 percent of the Communist voters answered that way). 27 percent of the sample answered that it is the Party of the dissatisfied; 17 percent, that it is the greatest Party of the Left and finally, 7 percent, that it is the party that wants the Revolution.

As Jean Ranger puts it:

These observations confirm that there is a deep tendency in the Communist electorate to define political events in terms of social conflicts. Here lies probably the explanation of the stability of Communist vote.³¹

Whatever the changes in the French Political System since the past twenty years and the difficulties of the Communist Movement, the social roots of Communist vote have insured the faithfulness of the Communist electorate in spite of environmental changes.

Communism and the French Left

The French Communist Party emphasizes the maintenance of its electoral success and representation in local and national assemblies. Communist parties have never underestimated the parliamentary and electoral forms of the political fight. Elections are conceived by Communists as "a criterion superior to all others in order to balance our action".* Electoral results, if not the only criterion, is the best standard however for the measure of the political determination of the working class. In order to maintain and if possible, increase the number of Communist votes, the FCP does not limit itself in keeping the confidence of its stable electorate. The Communist Party has also to balance the losses that are due to defections (15 to 20% from one election to the next) and, if possible, to gain new voters. This seems possible only if the outputs of the FCP answer to the demands and needs of potential voters.

The French Communist Party can make its actions and decisions correspond to the demands of this part of the electorate by giving up behavior that would otherwise upset demands from the environment. It can also fraternize with the non-Communist left. We can distinguish at least three periods in the history of French communism where a reconciliation has occurred between communism and part or the total of the French community.

A first attempt to reconcile French communism with the French community took place at the time of the French "Front Populaire" (1934-1938). Until February 1934, the attitude of Communist leaders with respect to non-Communist popular classes can be summarized by the formula "class against


* The word is from Friedrich Engels, Les Luttes de Classes en France. (Paris: Editions Sociales, 1966) p. 19.

class", which meant that the only way for the FCP to win voters and members was to attract them from the non-Communist left and principally from the old Socialist Party (SFIO). A sudden change occurred in the tactics of the French Communist Party, when in 1934 an electoral alliance was signed between the FCP and the SFIO under the name of Popular Front. This alliance would soon be extended to the Radical Party. As a result of the Popular Front tactics, the electoral score of the FCP was very high at the elections of June 1936. With 1.5 million voters the FCP won 72 seats in the Chamber of Deputies whereas, in 1932, it had won only 12 seats with 0.8 million votes.

What are the reasons for such a change in the behavior of the FCP? According to the classic interpretation, the French Communists followed the order from Moscow. However, it is worthwhile to point out that the decision of the FCP to establish an agreement with the SFIO dated back to July 1934, while the Seventh Congress of the Communist International, which was the occasion for the adoption of the anti-Fascist tactics of "united fronts" took place in July 1935. Thus, rather than to have recourse to the Soviet "deus ex machina", it seems justified to consider that the evolution of the FCP itself had determined, at least in part, the new attitude. The bolshevization period corresponded for the French Party to a loss in power and substance. As indicated by the scheme (see figure 2.4), in the early thirties, even the Party's very existence seemed threatened.

Can we infer that the FCP changed in 1936? For some scholars and historians, the change in dimension of the Communist Party has led to a change in the very nature of the Party. It seems indeed that the FCP has undergone an ideological release in the Popular Front period as well as a reconciliation with the French political community. Assuredly, this behavior differed totally from the previous one which was dictated by the class against

Figure 2.4



Evolution of Socialist and Communist Parties Memberships (1921-1936).

Source: Annie Kriegel, "Evolution des Effectifs du PCF pendant la Troisième République", Revue Française de Science Politique. (Feb. 1966).

class tactics and the radical opposition to the existing society and government. However, it does not seem that the FCP has changed in nature. When for example, Georges Lavau states that "since 1936, the FCP has engaged itself on the same path as Social Democratic parties"³² one can challenge this interpretation and ask whether any Social Democratic party has approved the German-Soviet treaty of 1939.

The same line of reasoning could be applied to the strategy of the "united front" which has been observed between 1943 and 1947. During this period, the FCP cooperated deeply with other political forces in the French community and participated in the French Government (1943-1947). However, here again how can we explain the sudden change in Communist behavior which followed the expulsion of Communist ministers from the French Government in March 1947? How can we explain that the FCP made its own the strategic analysis of Zhdanov, and proclaimed in 1949 that it would never declare war against the Soviet Union and then celebrated solemnly the seventieth anniversary of Stalin in 1950?

The French Communist Party and the Fifth Republic

The FCP has legitimized, at least in part, the regime, community and authorities of the French Political System. There is a deep attachment of the FCP to the French community and the solidarity of French communism to the Soviet Union is not a sufficient ground for negating this attachment to the French political community. The FCP has adopted most of the values and norms of the French Republic. "Liberté", "progrès", "laïcité", "souveraineté nationale", all these belong to Communist vocabulary as well as to other political formations. As Maurice Thorez once said:

History will probably show that one of the great merits of the Communist Party in France is that it has revalorized all the values, to paraphrase Nietzsche's word... We have retrieved the "Marseillaise" and the tri-colored flag of our ancestors, the soldiers of "l'an deux"...³³

We can also point out that the condemnation of gaullism rests on ethical grounds as well as on political reason.

Between us and gaullism, the opposition is not only political, it is also moral.³⁴

In relation to the authorities of the Regime of the Fifth Republic, the FCP no longer calls for the suppression of the 1958 Constitution but considers that it could be maintained under certain minor modifications.

Increasingly in recent years, the theme of a "united front" policy with the French Left has been emphasized. To what extent is such a policy workable in the France of today? Would it lead to a change in the character of the French Communist Party? There is a common agreement among French observers to recognize that the role played by the FCP within the French party system, at least until 1972, has been on the whole, negative. Indeed, there is a certain restraint on the French party system for which the Communist Party is partially responsible, for it appears that Communists could determine the future evolution of the party system if they were ready to establish with Socialists a workable opposition to the Gaullist majority.

If the common program established between Communists and Socialists in June 1972 represents a step toward the unification of both parties, there seemingly remains an obstacle which forbids a true "union of the Left". The FCP is isolated from the remaining of the French political community and the French non-Communist left is divided between those who are partisans and those who oppose the alliance with communism. The recent history of the French Socialist Movement has been strongly marked by this discord. In fact, faced with a weak and divided non-Communist left, communism appears to be in

a position of strength. Under these conditions, neither Communists nor Socialists really want a full integration of their organizations. Socialists hesitate to go too far because they fear their neighbor's strength. Communists think that a total union with Socialists in the present conditions would lead their Party toward social democracy.

Andre Malraux once said that "between gaullism and communism, there is nothing". As long as such a situation lasts it seems that the FCP will constitute the pivot of the union of the Left and of the entire French party system and will hinder the functioning of that party system.

Demands

If the FCP can easily control the demands from most of its members, the task is more difficult when dealing with Communist voters. The Communist electorate does not constitute a homogeneous "clientele" and the influence of the French Communist Party upon this clientele can vary in effectiveness.

Social Composition of the Communist Electorate

The study of the social composition of the Communist electorate rests on either official data or public opinion polls. As far as official results are concerned, it is difficult to establish the exact relationship between vote and occupation. Several studies have had the purpose of establishing this relationship by computing the correlation between working class votes and Communist votes³⁵ The public opinion poll technique has been also used in several other cases to study the Communist vote.

According to the IFOP opinion poll (see note 30 of this chapter) the

social composition of the Communist electorate is the following:

Table 2.4

No Occupation	Workers	Employees	Other White Collars	Agricul.	Businessmen/ Executive
16%	46%	8%	9%	6%	9%

Social Composition of Communist Electorate in 1965.

Source: J. Girault et al, "Remarques sur l'Etude de l'Electorat Communiste", Cahiers du Communisme. Vol. 12. (December, 1967) p. 39

The evolution of the composition of the Communist electorate has been the following:

Table 2.5

Social Category	Date of Poll					
	1948	1952	1958	1962	1965	1966
Agriculture	22	13	6	5	8	9
Non-wage Worker	6	9	14	6	7	9
White Collars	13	13	20	13	17	21
Workers	37	38	43	51	51	46
Retired*	—	3	17	7	—	—
Without occup.*	22	24	—	18	17	16

* The absence of percentages stems from variations in the definition of social categories from one public opinion poll to the other.

Evolution of Communist Electorate (Social Composition) Since 1948.

Source: Jean Ranger, "Le Vote Communiste", p. 243.

Part of the Communist electorate will be less receptive to the orders of the Communist leadership. The FCP can help these masses to bring their demands to it and channel these demands in order to avoid an overload of demands. However, there exists a source of possible stress for the Communist Party in the contradiction between the demand processing of a particular clientele and the demand processing of another. Until now, it seems that the French Communist Party has succeeded in the processing of such contradictory demands of heterogeneous masses. We will analyse this question when dealing with the functions that the FCP fulfills in the French Political System.

Mass Organizations

The FCP also maintains relations with mass organizations which help lengthen its actions and adapt them to the needs and demands of different categories of people. As R. Cornell pointed out:

It would appear, at least in some cases, that success in forming through mass organizations has brought about situations in which the mass-organizations have to some extent developed on their own and have threatened to lead the party rather than the reverse.³⁷

Did mass organizations affect the nature of the French Communist Party? Mass organizations are a variety of different institutions such as the Communist Youths, the "Mouvement de Défense des Exploités Familiaux" (MODEF), Associations of War Veterans or the "Confederation Generale du Travail" (CGT). Our analysis will focus on the CGT which is the most important French trade union and an important intermediary between the FCP and the masses.

The Communist influence upon the CGT is well known. Seven of the fifteen members of the Confederal Bureau of the CGT elected at the XXXVIIth

Congress of the organization (1969) were also members of the FCP. The President (Benoît Frachon) and the Secretary General (Georges Séguy) of the CGT are both members of the FCP Politburo.³⁸ However, it should be pointed out that the Communist membership of the CGT cannot represent more than 180 or 200,000 since at least one-third of the French Communist Party membership evaluated at about 3000,000 are not "blue collars". If we evaluate the CGT membership around 1,700,000,³⁹ it appears that Communist CGT members do not represent more than one-tenth of all the CGT affiliates.

The Communist militant in mass organizations must be distinguished from the party militant. Whereas the "party man" incarnates permanence and the basic Communist principles, mass organization Communists are more in contact with reality, and hence the mass organization militants are less doctrinaire; and are more likely to be sensitive to the day to day problems.

The party leadership has always been in a predominant position in the Party—mass organization relationship. This does not mean however that the latter (and especially the CGT) are kept in the shadows or ignored by the FCP leadership. On the contrary, Communists have placed the CGT at the center of their strategy. We have seen that one of the Communist strategies rests on the peaceful conquest of the political power. This particular strategy emphasizes the alliance with the non-Communist left. In the present situation, where this path toward a parliamentary take-over of power seems to be impossible, the FCP emphasizes also a second strategy which rests upon what Communists call a "generalized social movement". Under this perspective, the CGT obviously occupies a central place.

Intellectuals

The analysis of supports and demands directed to the French Communist Party should be distinguished by several levels. In addition to the level of the voters and militants, there is the level of Communist intellectuals. In the following analysis, we will distinguish two periods in the history of the relationships between Communist intellectuals and the party leadership, the breaking point being situated in the early sixties, when the FCP undertook the de-stalinization.

At the time of Lenin and Rosa Luxemburg, the distinction between the party leadership and the intellectuals was apparently without significance. The leaders of the Communist Movement were its intellectuals. Later, the distinction between political leaders and intellectuals varied from one Communist party to the other. For example, in the case of the Italian communism; political leaders have almost always been intellectuals, whereas in the case of the French Communist Party there has always been and there still is a clear cut distinction. However, the influence of French Communist intellectuals with regard to the party leadership, the content of their theoretical work and their latitude of action, have somewhat varied since the creation of the FCP. Until 1956, one could distinguish five different phases.

The first phase (1920-1924) was characterized by ideological confusion. Intellectually speaking, the main component of French communism seemed to be a sort of "revolutionary romanticism" based on admiration for the Soviet Revolution. Moreover, the French Communist Party was eager to attract sympathetic but hesitant intellectuals. "Those who are against the bourgeoisie are with us", wrote Paul Vaillant-Couturier in 1921,⁴⁰ re-echoing the

pronouncement of A. Lunacharsky, Lenin's Commissar for Public Instruction.

The second period corresponds to the bolshevization of the French Communist Party which underwent a sudden change of attitude in 1924. Suddenly, problems of art became ignored and Communist publication's intellectual contributors disappeared from sight. Their places were being taken by such leaders as, André Marty, André Cachin or Pierre Sénard, who started to denounce ceaselessly all manifestations of "intellectual arrogance". This period of drastic decrease of intellectual influence and activity within the Party was characterized by intellectual dogmatism and isolation from the "outside world". In 1929-1931, the Barbe-Celor leadership brought about a situation in which 70 percent of the Central Committee members were workers. To a certain extent, the situation of the FCP was similar to that of the "cult of the proletariat" recalled by Arthur Koestler in the German Communist Party under Thaelmann (early thirties).

[Intellectuals] had to be tolerated because Lenin had said so... The "Aryans" in the Party were the proletarians and the social origin of parents and grandparents was as weighty a factor both when applying for membership and during the biennial routine purges, as Aryan descent was with Nazis.⁴¹

However, the appointment of Maurice Thorez as the Secretary General in 1931 and the united front policy undertaken by the FCP after 1934, opened a new era in the relationship between the Party and intellectuals. Within the Party, a certain permissiveness succeeded the dogmatism of the previous phase and of more importance, a renewed interest for communism developed among non-Communist intellectuals (Emmanuel Mounier, André Gide, André Malraux, etc.) due in part to Communist appeal to all anti-Fascist intellectuals.

During the War, the French Communist Party found itself reintegrated once again in the French community. The Party's patriotic Resistance record

made it a focal point of loyalty and hope among many intellectuals. In 1945, the electoral successes of the FCP could be equated with a growing influence among intellectuals.

The last phase (1947-1956) was characterized by the isolation of the French Communist Movement in French society. French communism then entered, in 1947, the long intellectual night of zhdanovism that would not end until the early sixties. This phase showed a remarkable ideological sterility (distinction between bourgeois and proletarian science and art; Rajk, Tito and non-Communist intellectuals were cursed by party officials who kept paying their ritual homage to Maurice Thorez and the "genius Stalin"). Despite the propaganda surrounding the Peace Movement, the general sentiment among French Communist leaders was that intellectuals as a class, "had once again proven their inherent unreliability, failing to adopt class positions on subjects such as titoism, zhdanovism and Soviet labor camps...".⁴²

In conclusion, two traits can be pointed out. First, it seems that the Party's attraction for intellectuals followed an evolution similar to that of its attraction for voters and to a certain extent, adherents. After an initial period of intellectual confusion, the FCP has welcomed intellectuals into its ranks during united front and patriotic phases while turning its back to them during sectarian periods and in times of isolation. The second remark refers to the overall weakness of theoretical preoccupations in the French Communist Party which stems from the fact that this Party has been penetrated by Marxist knowledge slowly and then only superficially. Also, a peculiarity of the FCP (in comparison with the Italian Communist Party) lies in the fact that French Communist leaders have been mostly militants, sprung from the working class and thus less likely to bring any

original contribution to Marxist theory. This seems to be true even with Maurice Thorez whose personal contribution to marxism could not be compared with that of Togliatti or Gramsci.

There was a certain evolution which started in 1956, under the pressure of Communist intellectuals who wished to initiate a greater freedom of discussion inside the Party. However, this evolution which limited itself to a small circle of intellectuals had no influence upon the party leadership until 1962-1963, when the real changes occurred at the level of Communist intellectuals as well as at the level of party officials.

In the first place, there has been an evolution of the statute of French Communist intellectuals. In 1956, the attitude of the Party with regard to intellectuals can be summarized as follows: Communist intellectuals must fight on the political and ideological positions of the working class and consequently of the Party, which constitutes the only working class representative force. This means that Communist intellectuals, at the level of individual research and creation, must acknowledge the principle of class struggle and its developments on all levels of social and spiritual life. In other terms, there is a deliberate political choice according to which personal requirements for artistic expression must yield to the needs of political struggle for, as Jean Kanapa wrote:

The revolutionary worker's movement cannot ignore the practical influence of the objective significance which is attached to what one states as the expression of a subjective thought, in the context of class struggle.⁴³

At the level of social analysis, Communist intellectuals are considered as a faction of the middle-class, fighting with the ideological position of the working class.

In taking part in the national struggle of the most advanced class (i.e. the working class), intellectuals are in contact with Marxist theory which in turn influences their works and their thought.⁴⁴

The Communist intellectual is thus only revolutionary in consideration to its ideological adherence to the proletariat. As a representative of his social class (bourgeoisie or middle class) he is nothing.

In the early sixties, there has been a re-evaluation of the role of French Communist intellectuals. At the XVIIth FCP Congress (1964), the originality of intellectuals as such has been officially recognized as well as the necessity of freedom of creation. Already in 1963, Roger Garaudy had published his D'un Réalisme Sans Rivage, in which he claims the right to appreciate freely such authors as Kafka and Saint John Perse, who were for a time condemned by the Communist party leadership. Finally, in 1966, the Central Committee of Argenteuil was organized. Its purpose was to discuss ideological and cultural problems and the relationship between intellectuals and party leadership. The issue of this Central Committee was a text which was to become the chart of the FCP in this matter. This text is the sign of the profound evolution the Party had undergone since 1956.⁴⁵

(1) The contribution of Communist intellectuals in the cultural and ideological domains is labeled "decisive". Moreover, it is said that "Communist intellectuals have the same share as workers and peasants in the elaboration of the theory" (Résolution, p.320).

(2) The right to diversity is recognized. "The development of science requires research and discussions. The Communist Party would not hinder these discussions or bring about an a priori truth, even less settle in an authoritative way..." (Résolution, p.279).

(3) The specificity of his work and the personal freedom of the artist or intellectual is also recognized officially. "Experimental needs of art and literature should not be ignored or negated" (Résolution, p.271), and also "intellectuals are urged to approach open problems of science, philosophy

and art with boldness and independence of judgement" (Résolution, p. 280).

The Central Committee of Argenteuil is thus the sign of a notable evolution in the attitude of the Party with respect to Communist intellectuals. However, it is worthwhile to point out that Communist intellectuals or artists do not have the same freedom as the bourgeois intellectuals. If possibilities of dialogue have developed inside the Party, the constitution of tendencies of factions is still condemned.

The responsibility of the theory still belongs to Marxist—Leninist parties which represent the working class, direct its struggles and incarnate its experience. (Résolution, p.277)

At the opposite side, of what is observable within the Italian Communist Party, the French Communist Party still holds the monopoly in the definition of its ideology.

STRUCTURE OF COMMUNIST IDEOLOGY

The core of Marxist-Leninist theory is based on a fundamental analysis of capitalism. This fundamental analysis provides the ground from which all specific analysis derives. In the following section, we will show that the new events that have occurred in the French Political System and with which the French Communist Party has been confronted in the recent past have been analyzed through this fundamental scheme by the Communist authorities. The revisions and re-adaptations made by the FCP only dealt with marginal aspects of this fundamental analysis. Thus, they do not question the general explanatory scheme.

What are the components of this fundamental analysis?*

* The information contained in this section is mainly based on: Frédéric Bon, "Structure de l'Ideologie Communiste", Le Communisme en France, Cahier de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 175, (Paris: A. Colin, 1969)

is that of the general crisis of capitalism; the term being understood as some sort of generalized cancer by which all the organisms of society are affected. This general crisis of capitalism has gone through three steps:

- establishment of the first Socialist state
- creation of the Socialist camp during and after World War II
- reinforcement of the Socialist camp and emancipation of colonial peoples during the fifties and sixties

We can see that the criteria that are retained in depicting the evolution of the Capitalist world are above all political rather than economic.

The stages of the general crisis of capitalism correspond to the stages of the progression of the world Communist Movement.

According to Communists, at the time of its general crisis, capitalism does not provide for a full development of productive forces. Economic crisis and war, whose frequency and scope have increased, have yielded to a decrease in production (in relative value). Capitalism is thus engaged in a self-destructive process because its fundamental mechanisms (profit and competition) are destroying the very conditions of their functioning. Competition encourages the triumph of the stronger over the weak thus, this leads to economic concentration and monopoly. The economic market is dominated by multi-national firms and, each state whose purpose was formerly to maintain the bourgeois order are becoming now economic agents at the service of big corporations.

Since World War II, the Communist theory assumes that capitalism has taken the form of "state monopolistic capitalism" whereby the pursuit and accumulation of profit leads to a decrease of the rate of profit and thus, in order to increase their benefit margins, Capitalist firms and states exploit the proletariat and under-developed countries (imperialism). According to Stalin:

The main characteristics and requirements of the fundamental economic law of capitalism could be formulated like this: to insure a maximal profit margin by exploiting, ruining and impoverishing the majority of a given country's workers, by systematically subjecting or plundering under-developed countries peoples and finally, by militarizing national economy in order to insure maximal profits.⁴⁶

Politically, state monopolistic capitalism yields to an authoritarian regime inside and to imperialism outside. Inside, parliamentary democracy which was the political regime corresponding to the former stage of capitalism has become an obstacle for monopolies. The monopolistic strata are thus in favor of authoritarian regimes such as fascism. Outside, the most powerful Imperialist (United States) submits other Imperialists which are less powerful (France, England). Communists thus consider monopolistic regimes as anti-national. The main force of resistance against these anti-national and anti-social trends of state monopolistic capitalism is represented by the proletariat who in turn is directed by the International Communist Movement.

Recent events that have occurred in the French Political System have contradicted Marxist-Leninist analysis. We will distinguish three series of events which have affected the Communist doctrine in France.

- economic expansion of Western Capitalist countries since 1945
- establishment of the Common Market
- establishment of the Fifth Republic

A fourth phenomenon, that is, the transformation of the structure of the French working class, cannot be included in these categories of events because it has not threatened the working class clientele of the French Communist Party.

Economic Expansion

The answer of the French Communist Party to this particular stress has taken the form of a virulent campaign against the process of "pauperization" (in the absolute terms) of the working class. Maurice Thorez and French Communist leaders have, during the fifties, assured without qualification the fallacious character of economic progress in a bourgeois Capitalist regime.

In the France of today, the hourly wages have generally a buying power one-half inferior to what it was before World War II.⁴⁷ Changes in clothing habits of the French proletariat confirm the "law of pauperization".

The deterioration of housing conditions couples with an obvious decrease in the quality of clothing. Because the cap which was formerly worn by all is too expensive, one now prefers the beret; and the "bleus de travail" which cost several thousand francs are replaced by "salopettes". Velvet pants which were formerly very popular are today of a prohibitive price category.⁴⁸

Moreover, the law of pauperization is not a recent phenomena; it applies to the entire history of capitalism. In 1955, Maurice Thorez declared that "the Parisian worker [was eating] less meat than during the Second Empire".⁴⁹ In 1959, Maurice Thorez again asserted the absolute character of the law of pauperization in answering the criticism of the Italian Communist Spano.

Experience has verified the law of pauperization, absolute as well as relative. Our merit does not lie in the fact that we recalled this law. Our merit is to have done this in a time where the ideas of others are gaining ground and where the apparent situation of the working class seems to infirm our assertions.⁵⁰

However, in the sixties, the theory of pauperization has been somewhat restated. French Communist theorists have attempted to curtail the notion by showing that pauperization must be analyzed in terms of the evolution

of the needs of the working class. The FCP has given up the thesis according to which worker's consumption is constantly decreasing. Thus, in a speech in 1966, Waldeck-Rochet analyzed pauperization in terms of purchasing power. According to the former Secretary General of the FCP, the Fifth French plan (1966-1970) had as a purpose to "reduce the income of the workers and lessen social and cultural investments in order to insure profit for the big corporations"; the result being that:

Since 1957, the buying power of wage-earning workers has remained the same for most and it has even regressed for the most under-privileged categories of workers.⁵¹

In fact, what we see is that if the formulation of the problem has changed, the structure and the purposes of the exercise remain the same. The theory of pauperization has been maintained.

The Common Market

According to French Communists, the Common Market incarnates all the evils. It is anti-social in that it represents an attempt to solve the contradictions of European capitalism and imperialism. Thus, for Communists, it is wrong to say that the Common Market will be a factor of prosperity for the working class because increased competition between the partners of the Common Market will weaken French industry and thus lead to an increase in unemployment.

The Six will organize in common misery, unemployment for the populations ... they will keep the benefits for their trusts.⁵²

The common objective assigned to the Communist parties of the Six thus to organize a large front whose purpose would be to prevent the "establishment of what is conceived as a war machine against the Socialist

countries"⁵³ The Common Market is thus also anti-Soviet. For French Communists, the only glue that helps this construction stick together is anti-sovietism.

Unless the reason of anti-sovietism was not there, everything would already be "à feu et à sang".⁵⁴

Finally, the Common Market is anti-national. Like every anti-Soviet policy, it leads to a reinforcement of German power. According to early Communist interpretation of the evolution of the Common Market, Germany would become the arbiter between France and England and would finally rule the entire European Community.

The French Government is adopting a policy which is absolutely anti-national for it gives life to the old Hitlerian dream of German hegemony.⁵⁵

Furthermore, the anti-national character of the Common Market policy is conceived by French Communists as a submission by each partner of its national sovereignty.

What has been the further evolution of the Communist attitude with respect to the European Economic Community? In September 1962, an international conference in Moscow was attended by the economic specialists of twenty-two Communist parties. The purpose of the conference was to study among other topics, the Common Market and its economic and political problems. The position held by the French Communist Party at this meeting differs discernibly from the others and especially from the position of the Italian Communist Party. The latter seemed to be rather prudent in its evaluation whereas the representatives of the French Party gave a very "hard" interpretation of the European integration into the Common Market.

A first difference between the Italian and the French interpretations lies in the explanation of the increase in production within the six members of the EEC. With this in mind, the Conference assumed that the "creation

of the Common Market did not provide any basis for the development of production and trade",⁵⁶ The FCP seemed to adhere totally to this thesis:

If the Common Market would have not existed, as the example of Japan shows, the evolution would not have been different... The favorable situation of capitalistic European countries stems essentially from causes other than economic integration.⁵⁷

Another conclusion reached by the Conference recognized that the "Common Market had contributed to an increase in production. The application of the Treaty of Rome [1957] has contributed to an increase of investments and accelerated the process of modernization of enterprises, which has led to a certain transformation of the economy and organization of monopolies"⁵⁸ While the French agreed with the first thesis, the Italians favored the second conclusion.⁵⁹

Another difference between the French and Italians lies in the interpretation of which attitude was to be followed with regard to the Common Market. The attitude of the International Conference remained very prudent:

The working class defies the Imperialist international plot with the powerful weapon of international unity. However, the existence in European countries of common problems stemming from [European integration] creates objective possibilities for elaborating and coordinating the action of national detachments of the working class.⁶⁰

If the formula reached by the International Conference remained very vague, it seems that most of its attendants were in favor of a certain coordination in the struggle of the Communist parties on the European scale. The Italians relied heavily on this proposition whereas the French conclusion tended toward a different attitude. For the French Communists, the working class struggle ought to develop above all and primarily within each country.

This international struggle is lead essentially in the national frame.⁶¹

French Communists did not want to recognize the Common Market because to

them, this institution was an abnormal and reactionary form given by capitalism to international development. According to French Communists, it was out of the question to transform the European Economic Community from its present state of Capitalist form into a Socialist European community or "Europe of the peoples", without first transforming the society of each partner of the Community.

To speak of a Europe of the peoples in the present conditions of the Capitalistic Common Market is an imposture ... A Europe of the peoples will remain an utopia until each of the peoples of Europe puts to an end the domination and exploitation by the monopolies within its own territory...⁶²

The renewed discussion of the European theme by the French Communist Party during the presidential election of 1965 led it to refine its position. The fundamental hostility of the French Party vis a vis the Common Market was reiterated but, the idea that the Common Market could be used for purposes other than the one it had been established for was proposed. Speaking of the EEC, Jacques Kahn said that:

There are examples in history of institutions established in given circumstances and under the influence of given forces, which have been adapted, in other circumstances, to other ends.⁶³

However, the qualifications which were brought about in 1966 had a limited influence on the whole theory. In fact, if the formulation of the problem evolved, the appreciation of the European phenomena remains identical to what it was before. It presently appears that the FCP pursues two related goals. First, to maintain a total opposition to the European Economic Community, such as it is, second to maintain under the name of "a great and true democratic and pacific Europe"^{*} a strong adhesion to the concept of a Europe divided into independent nation-states. This allows us to see

* This is the terminology employed in the common program (June 1972).

the limits of the common program established by the Socialist Party and the Communist Party with respect to Europe. It allows us to understand the content of the Communist instruction in relation with the referendum on the enlargement of the EEC (April 1972). Socialists advocated the abstention from voting because for them, the question of the admittance of Great Britain to the Common Market and the extension of this institution to other European countries, even though it would have positive consequences, was not an essential political problem for the French people. When Communists advocated the "non", they signified their radical opposition to the unification of Western European countries in a Capitalist institution because the constitution of a structured and unified Europe would be contrary to the interests of the Socialist camp.*

The French Communist Party and the Fifth Republic

The establishment of the Fifth Republic (1958) has affected directly the FCP's influence. The Communist electorate represented only 14.3% of registered voters (3,907,763) at the general elections of November 1958. In the preceding elections, since 1945, the FCP had always scored more than 20 percent of the registered voters. Furthermore, in 1958, the representation of the Communist Party in the French Parliament had been reduced drastically. The restoration of General de Gaulle was interpreted by the FCP as the beginning of a process which would eventually lead to a Fascist kind of

* It is worthwhile to point out that the electoral strength of French communism represents 31.4% of totality of the Communist electorates in the nine members of the Common Market. Furthermore, inside France, Communist opposition to the European Economic Community should have been able to attract other votes especially Nationalist votes from the extreme right and from some Gaullists.

political regime. In an analysis called "De Gaulle and Fascism", Roger Garaudy points out that:

The "Rassemblement du Peuple Francais"* presented the social characteristics of a Fascist party... Like all its predecessors in the path to fascism, De Gaulle does not hesitate ... to call for a great social demagogy... De Gaulle develops also a national demagogy which is characteristic of all forms of fascism.⁶⁴

French communism evaluated the May 1958 events as an attempt to establish a Fascist regime in France. A historical precedent served as a reference this being February 1934 when the extreme right had attempted to take over the power from the established Government. Thus, like in 1934, the FCP attempted to act as an obstacle against the Gaullists who sought to establish a Fascist regime. One can measure with this perspective, the error in the interpretation of the French Communist Party when it engaged in the battle of the referendum of September and in the legislative elections of November 1958.

Nature of Gaullist Power

The stabilization of French political life after 1958 led to a refined diagnosis with respect to the nature of the Gaullist power. It was conceived as being a personal reinforced power of the monopolies; that is to say that the Gaullist power occupied an intermediary position between parliamentary regime (like that of the Fourth Republic) and fascism. In the Communist point of view, there was a continuation between the policy of the Fourth Republic and the one of the Fifth Republic. De Gaulle pursued the same objectives with reinforced means.

* The RPF was an anti-parliamentary movement making use of De Gaulle's name during part of the Fourth Republic.

The policy of the present Government continues and aggravates that of its predecessors.⁶⁵

This is the orthodox interpretation of the nature of the Gaullist power. However, for several Communist theorists, Gaullism does not represent a continuation of the Fourth Republic policy. For example, the economist Serge Mallet thinks that it is another form of policy, attempting to bridge the gap between the political orientation on the one hand and the expansion and structural modifications of French economy on the other. Mallet differentiated two kinds of capitalism, one static and the other dynamic. Another interpretation of Gaullism assumes that it differs sensibly from the preceding regime in that it is an attempt to define an independent policy for France vis a vis the United States. This is as it seems, one of the deviationist positions held by such Communist leaders as Servin and Casanova, who were excluded from the Party in 1961. These interpretations of the Gaullist power which originated in the early sixties seem contrary to the interpretation of the French Communist party leadership which categorically denies any independent characteristic in the French policy of the Fifth Republic as compared to the Fourth Republic.

The whole Gaullist policy is a policy oriented toward the Atlantic bloc, all this policy is a policy that leads to war... that would lead to generalized war if there were not the Socialist countries, the Peace Movement and the working class.⁶⁶

According to the Communist leadership, monopolistic capitalism and its corrolary, the cooperation between French and American imperialisms, cannot coexist with national interest. This interpretation stresses a clear dychotomy, resting upon the following dilemma. A policy serves either the interests of the monopolies or it expresses national interest. Theorists and leaders who have tried to solve this dilemma by attempting to offer a more refined interpretation have met a categoric rejection from the

Communist leadership.

Algerian Policy

The analysis was the following in the beginning:

The Government pursues the Algerian war.⁶⁷

Under this perspective, the initiatives of the President of the Republic which did not lead to a hardening of the Algerian policy were judged as attempts to fool the opinion. Thus, when General De Gaulle proclaimed in September 1959 the right for the Algerian people to "self-determination", the Political Bureau of the FCP denounced this measure on the grounds that it was merely a political mystification.

General De Gaulle refuses to negotiate with those against whom we have been fighting since nearly five years. He does not speak of a cease-fire anymore; he negated the reality of the Algerian nation. After this retreat from preceding declarations everything is subordinated to military disaster or reddition for Algeria under the name of pacification. In these conditions, the alledged freedom of choice and self-determination constitute only political trickery directed against those who in Algeria are fighting for independence. It is also an attempt to fool democratic opinion in France and around the world.⁶⁸

However, in the last months of 1959, the position of the FCP was restated. Leaving behind the explanation that self-determination was a mystification, Maurice Thorez had recourse to the explanation that self-determination was imposed on the Gaullist regime by the pressure of the masses and the evolution of international relations.

The courageous resistance and sacrifices of the Algerian people and also the solidarity of the French working class and of all democrats have led to a first important result... Recognizing that the pacification has been a failure, General De Gaulle has acknowledged the right for the Algerian people to self-determination.⁶⁹

In fact, the correction constituted only a facade. The general diagnosis

did not vary and the fundamental analysis remained the same. The idea that decolonization of Algeria could be the result of a coherent political plan from the part of De Gaulle was refuted by Communists. Secretary General Thorez merely resorted to another variant but the explanatory scheme remained identical to itself. The ratification of peace in Algeria (1962) did not modify this fundamental analysis. On the contrary, the signing of the Evian Agreements along with the announcement of the referendum on presidential elections led the FCP to take the occasion of the constitutional reform to harden its position on the regime.

It becomes clearer and clearer that the Fascist threat does not come only from the "ultras" of the OAS* but also from the Gaullist power itself.⁷⁰

Foreign Policy

How did the French Communist Party react to the initiatives of De Gaulle with respect to foreign policy? In 1962, the FCP analyzed the foreign policy of the Gaullist regime as a continuation of the policy which took place during the Fourth Republic. The only difference was in the aggravation of the tendencies observed before 1958. For example the FCP reacted in the following manner to the German-French treaty which followed Adenauer's visit to France (July, 1962) and De Gaulle's visit to Germany (October, 1962).

Since 1947, all the predecessors of De Gaulle have favored an Atlantic policy which has permitted the renewal of German militarism. De Gaulle ... has aggravated to a degree which has never been matched yet the danger of foreign policy based on the Cold War and the arm race which run contrary to national interest and world peace.⁷¹

* The OAS (Organisation Armée Secrète) was a para-military secret organization established for the purpose of killing De Gaulle and keeping Algeria French.

The FCP perceived French foreign policy as a continuation of the Cold War. With this perspective in mind, it reacts strongly to the refusal of De Gaulle to ratify the Moscow treaty (July, 1963) on the limitation of atomic tests.

Gaullist power is in the first line of the enemies of international peace and detente... The conclusion of the Moscow treaty without the participation of the French Government confirms that the foreign policy of the latter is contrary to the interests of France and peace.⁷²

After the recognition of the People's Republic of China by the French Government and De Gaulle's declaration in favor of the neutralization of Viet Nam, there was a transformation in the appreciation of the Gaullist foreign policy by French communism. In 1964, Maurice Thorez declared:

If we declare ourselves against the personal power, we are not 'a priori' against this or that measure which can be dictated by circumstances that De Gaulle does not control or by the development of imperialist contradictions inside and outside.⁷³

In fact it appears that the same framework of analysis which had been used in 1962 in order to explain the Algerian policy of the French President, served to account for the positive aspects of De Gaulle's foreign policy. That is, those positive initiatives that were caused by external pressures. Thus, Waldeck-Rochet, during the XVIIth Congress of the FCP declared:

The evolution of the world balance of powers is in favor of socialism..., the aggravation of inter-imperialist contradictions are powerful factors which have already obligated and will again obligate some leaders of Western countries De Gaulle included, to take into account the realities.⁷⁴

The same analysis was made at the XVIIIth Congress in 1967:

Following the changes in the international balance of powers and the aggravation of the contradictions between the monopolies of different countries..., De Gaulle has been led to take some measures which represent to a certain extent a disengagement of France from the American tutelage and to undertake a more realistic policy of international cooperation.⁷⁵

It appears that the fundamental analysis of De Gaulle's foreign policy by the Communists rests upon two different basis. The first refers

to the solidarity of the Imperialist camp, the second rests upon the diversity and the contradictions observed within that camp. The following quotation is illustrative of the fundamental ambiguity and equivocalness of this part of the Communist ideology.

The fundamental solidarity which links French imperialism (among others) to the American imperialism against the Socialist world, does not suppress however the contradictions between them⁷⁶

The Communist framework of analysis offers two variants in order to explain French foreign policy. In the first place, Communists emphasize the solidarity between French and American imperialisms. This emphasis allows Communists to denounce the pro-Atlantist and anti-Soviet aspects of French foreign policy. Thus, for example, after the conversations between Georges Pompidou and Richard Nixon in December 1971, the FCP criticized the new orientation of French foreign policy in the following manner:

One can observe a leaning of the present regime towards atlantism, a reinforcement of ties with Washington and an insertion of French foreign policy within the general strategy of American imperialism.⁷⁷

Another example when the French armed forces, without formally reintegrating with NATO cooperate fully with the partners of the Atlantic Alliance, l'Humanité asks whether "the military plans of Pompidou in Europe" would not lead to "the realization of a new form of the European Defense Community"⁷⁸ *

In the second place, the French Communist Party can find "positive aspects" in French foreign policy. These positive aspects are explained by the contradictions between imperialisms. We have seen that the same framework

* The EDC which had been proposed by several European countries in the early fifties had met the opposition of numerous French political leaders and organizations. The Communist Party especially undertook a strong campaign against the proposition on the ground that it would lead to a renewal of German hegemony.

of analysis has been applied with respect to the Gaullist Algerian policy. If the Fifth Republic represents evil, and consequently cannot do good voluntarily, the pressure of the events serve to explain the positive aspects of the Algerian policy.

A second type of analysis which is applied to topics such as economic stagnation or the Common Market rests upon a different basis. Here, the fundamental analysis does not change, it is only the argumentation which is being shifted. For example, when Communist interpretation foreconomic expansion changes from one particular argument (i.e. economic expansion is a myth, what is real is economic stagnation) to the next (i.e. economic expansion coexists with relative pauperization of the proletariat), what remains is the normative content of the framework (i.e. capitalism means misery of the masses).

There exist for the FCP several modes of explanation for all events. Whatever the direction of French foreign policy, the trend of economic expansion or the nature of the political regime, they are explained in advance. One can say that the structure of the Communist ideology makes it impossible to be challenged by facts. But is it not the proper of an ideology to be impossible to be demonstrated wrong? What we have tried to show is that Communist ideology as a structure is constituted of several alternative modes of explanation or variants organized around a stable normative core that does not change.

Chapter 3

VALIDITY OF FUNCTIONALISM

We have observed that the major assumption of the systems approach is the idea of the normal operation of the system and of the functions which serve to maintain that normal operation. This assumption must be linked with the closely related idea which goes by the name of functionalism. The basic question posed by functional analysis is this: what effect or purpose does a particular element of a system have on the operation of that system?

APPLICATION OF FUNCTIONALISM TO THE
FRENCH COMMUNIST PARTY: METHODOLOGY

Functionalism offers an intriguing realm of inquiry when applied to the French Communist Party. On one hand, it appears that the French Communist Party is a party "not like the others". Yet, as H. Ehrmann puts it:

A party which for more than twenty years has had an electoral following between 19 and 25 percent of the voters at all parliamentary elections and which is represented by more than twenty thousands city and town councilors and more than one thousand mayors throughout France is ... a party like the others.¹

As it became obvious that the French Communist Party plays an important role in the French Political System, the attempt to conceptualize in terms of functions the idea of the participation of this organization to its political system has started to emerge as a major concern among French students of politics.

Functions of Political Parties

W. Flanigan and E. Fogelman² have pointed out the existence of a variety of types of functional analysis which are included in this ambiguous term. We can distinguish three kinds of functional analysis as applied to political parties.

In eclectic functionalism, functions are considered as purposes served by parties. Under this approach, the analyst is concerned with the structures, history and ideology of the party he studies in addition to its functions.

Eclectic functionalism involves no commitment to a distinctive functional approach and, the theoretical implication of including the concept of function among the categories of analysis is quite limited.³

With this understanding of the term function, the researcher will merely conduct a descriptive inventory of the roles fulfilled by political parties.

Frank Sorauf's study of the Political Parties in the American System⁴

belongs to this trend. Sorauf distinguishes three main functions-activities of parties: electoral activity, control of authorities and mobilization of individuals for certain political ideas or stakes. Illustrative of this trend would also be David Apter's conception of the role of political parties in developing countries.⁵

Political parties in a modernizing society have an active role in initiating the formulation of new ideas, opening new channels of communication for those ideas and establishing links between public opinion and leaders.⁶

This kind of functionalism is by far the most widespread and at the same time, the least developed theoretically of current types of functional analysis.

At the opposite end of eclectic functionalism is structural-functionalism, which is the most ambitious functional approach to political life.

Flanigan and Fogelman write that:

The promise of structural-functionalism is no less than to provide a consistent and integrated theory from which can be derived explanatory hypothesis relevant to all aspects of a political system.⁷

This framework which has been developed by Talcott Parsons and Marion Levy⁸ has the following characteristic features. It emphasizes the whole system as the unit of analysis and postulates particular functions as requisites to the maintenance of the whole system. Its concern is to show the functional interdependence of diverse structures within the whole system. The best known structural-functional framework in political science is that

developed by Gabriel Almond⁹ who distinguishes three functional requisites in his latest work, Comparative Politics, A Developmental Approach. In the first place, there are the conversion functions, involving interest articulation, interest aggregation, political communication, rule making, rule application and rule adjudication. Then, there is the capability of the system which refers to "the operation of the political system as an 'individual' in its environment".¹⁰ Finally, the third cluster of functions refer to the way in which political systems "maintain or adapt themselves to pressures for change over the long run, system maintenance and adaptation functions, political recruitment and political socialization".¹¹

A third variety, empirical functionalism, which will be the focus of our study, takes place between both extremes. Under this approach, functions are conceptualized as activities of parties insofar as they satisfy the demands of individuals in the social system. Empirical functionalism as applied to political parties will thus focus upon the analysis of the observable consequences of party activities. Empirical functionalism has been applied by Robert Merton in his well known study of the political machine of American parties.¹² As in structural-functional analysis, the concept of function is defined by Merton in relation to the functional requisites of a political system. Functional analysis in this connection starts from the proposition that any given system will have certain conditions for survival. However, when structural-functionalism insists on a numerically specific set of functional requisites, at a rather high level of abstraction,¹³ empirical functionalism is more flexible in that it yields to an "open ended and expandable listing of functions performed by a given structure".¹⁴

According to Merton, the logic of empirical functional analysis

involves the following steps:

First of all, certain functional requirements of the (system) are established, requirements which must be satisfied if the (system) is to survive or to operate with some degree of effectiveness. Second, there is a concrete and detailed description of the arrangements through which these requirements are typically met in 'normal' cases. Third, if some of the typical mechanisms for meeting these requirements are destroyed, or are found to be functioning inadequately, the observer is sensitized to the need for detecting compensating mechanisms which fulfill the necessary function. Fourth, and implicit in all that precedes, there is a detailed account of the structures for which the functional requirements hold, as well as a detailed account of the arrangements through which the function is fulfilled.¹⁵

Since we focus on the functions performed by a particular structure, we will give the concept of functional requisite a "heuristic" value that is, rather than being concerned with functional requisites at the level of the whole system, we will isolate a particular realm of study within the system and ask a series of precise questions related to this particular realm of study. If we assess that the French Communist Party plays a role in the performance of specific political functions, it is crucial in the first place that the functions in question be defined precisely. In the second place, we will specify the conditions under which the FCP will or will not perform the various functions generally assigned to parties.

Scope of Functionalism as Applied to the French Communist Party

Several concepts related to functional analysis as applied to the FCP have to be clarified. A first distinction refers to whether the analyst is attempting to assess consequences or if he is attempting to identify a causal variable when focusing on the functions of a political party.

According to Howard Scarrow:

In the first case, when the author speaks of parties as performing a function, he is stating his assessment of the consequences of party... where party actions are viewed as integral parts of a complex and interrelated system of action and where the purpose of analysis is to delineate the 'part played' or the contribution to the whole made by one structure... in the ongoing interrelated system. In the other case, the author is attempting to identify a relatively autonomous causal variable which is said to explain a characteristic of the society.¹⁶

In the causal analysis, party function is interpreted in terms of an independent variable bringing about some result (dependent variable) in the political system. According to Scarrow, this orientation of functionalism which leads to a reification of political parties as willful groups of individuals, does not represent true functionalism. The rejection of the interpretation of party functions as a causal variable and its limitation to the integral part played by a political party in a political system, rests on the ground that the basic requirement for functional analysis is "that the object of analysis represents a standardized item* such as social roles, institutional patterns, etc."¹⁷ rather than the results of actors' decisions or actions.

The analysis of the functions performed by the FCP in the French Political System in terms of standardized items (i.e. functional consequences of patterned actions), rises an important problem. For if the researcher starts by conceiving the French Communist Party as an integral part of an interrelated system of action, he will come into conflict with the interpretation of that party, developed in the former chapter, according to which the FCP is composed of two poles, one of them being a non-varying pole which does not contribute to the system. As we will see, functionalism provides an inspiring realm of inquiry for the French Communist Party but,

* The emphasis is ours.

it applies only to one dimension of that party, that is the pole of the contact between French communism and the French Political System.

A second distinction is made between manifest and latent functions. The concept of latent function refers to consequences of party activities in the system or in the satisfaction of a need which was not consciously intended. The advantage of the concept of latent function is that it provides for the consideration of all the consequences of a patterned action and not merely those consequences that were consciously avowed.

A third distinction is between functional and dysfunctional consequences of party activities. Merton writes that:

Functions are those observed consequences which make for the adaptation or adjustment of a given system and dysfunctions, those observed consequences which lessen the adaptation or adjustment of the system.¹⁸

The distinction between functions and dysfunctions makes it clear that parties may have multiple consequences, both positive and negative, for the system as a whole and for the party itself. A political party is not merely functional for the political system; this seems to be true as well for the French Communist Party as for any other party.* This assumption that political parties (and any political institution or practice) has neither entirely positive nor negative functions to perform in the political system, stems from the fact that political systems are systems where conflict takes place as well as integration. In a goal system, what is functional for the part is functional for the whole. In other terms,

* For example, is it functional that neither the Republican nor the Democratic parties in the United States are able to represent politically ethnic minorities? A few decades from now, it will appear that the American party system did not "answer" the functional requirement of political integration of these minorities.

the consequences of the activity of the parts are always functional for the whole whereas, in a social or political system, there are possible disparate consequences of a particular social activity (or function) for diverse groups within the system or for individuals within these groups.

FUNCTIONS OF THE FRENCH COMMUNIST PARTY

To the distinction between latent and manifest functions and between functions and dysfunctions, we must add a third distinction between the types of statements that are usually made in functionalism. As Howard Scarrow suggests, it is necessary to distinguish between three types of statements within the orientation of functionalism.

The first type of statement has for its implied subject the presence of parties... An example is the claim... that political parties enable the voter to make meaningful choices at election time... Although the grammatical subject of [the statement] is parties, a more reasonable interpretation would hold that the subject is the presence of parties and that the statements are to be read as assessments of the consequences stemming from this presence... A second type of statement... emphasizes the nature of parties and what effects stem from this nature. A third type [of statement] refers to the patterned actions of parties. Such statements are intended to be assessments of the consequences which stem from these actions.¹⁹

Thus, when we assert that the French Communist Party performs the electoral function (structuring the vote) or the programmatic function (definition of political orientations), we must be aware that we refer to two different orientations of functionalism. The function of structuring the vote must be understood as the consequence of the presence of the French Communist Party, whereas the programmatic function must be viewed as a consequence of the nature of the Party.

Functions as Consequences of the Presence of the FCP

Under this perspective, we will investigate first the electoral activity of the French Communist Party. But, it appears that the functional consequence of the presence of the Party is not only one of structuring the vote; the FCP must also be viewed as a frame for Communist followers and thus, as performing a function of "encadrement" of the masses.

Structuring the Vote

Like all other political parties, the French Communist Party attempts to rally votes in its own favor. When Leon Epstein writes that this activity of structuring the vote represents "the minimum function of all political party in a modern democracy"²⁰ the statement must be read as an assessment of the consequences stemming from the presence of the party. Our question will be whether and if so, to what extent, the French Communist Party is performing the vote structuring function. In order to answer this question, we will examine whether Communist voters respond to the label of the Party or to considerations of personality, class, religion, doctrine etc.

Since Maurice Duverger's book was published²¹ it is common place among political scientists to distinguish between "cadres parties" also referred to as parties of individual representation based on the local parish pump and the operation of the parliamentary factions, and parties of "mass integration" which attempt to structure a framework for the intellectual and moral "encadrement" of the masses. In the case of parties of individual representation (e.g. Radical Party or Gaullist Party, at least

at the origin), voters in a single election are likely to respond to considerations of personality - local personalities or "notables" in the case of the Radical Party; the charismatic personality of General De Gaulle in the case of the early Gaullist Party. On the contrary, in the case of mass-integration parties, to which the French Communist Party belongs undoubtedly, this type of consideration plays no role.

Indeed, there have always been two requirements in the selection of Communist candidates for general elections by the Party. The first requirement refers to the elimination of strong personalities. As Duverger writes:

The Party generally chooses its candidates among "les obscurs et les sans-grade", people who do not possess personal notoriety except in the case of party leaders; and this confirms our assertion, since their reputation stems from the Party and not from themselves.²²

The second requirement refers to systematic riding or "parachutage" of Communist representatives from one election to the other in order to forbid the transformation of Communist constituencies into personal realms where local ties would allow the deputies to show independence of action with respect to the party line.

Communist officials claim that their Party is the party of the working class. Does this mean that the Party's alignment is the consequence of a pre-existing class division in the French society? The answer is no, since the majority of French workers vote for parties other than the Communist Party. To say that the FCP is the party of the working class means only that workers represent the most numerous socio-economic category in the French Communist electorate and membership. The following table is a clear illustration of the fact that the belonging to the working class cannot be considered a determinant factor in structuring Communist vote.

Figure 3.1

	Professional	
3%	6%	5%
	Small Businessmen	
9%	10%	11%
	White Collar Workers	
15%	15%	16%
	Rural	
9%	17%	16%
	Retired	
19%	22%	24%
	Workers	
45%	30%	28%
Communist Party		Gaullist Party

Socio-Professional Distribution of Communist and Gaullist Electorates

Compared with the Same Distribution in Metropolitan France (1967)

Source: IFOP, February, 1967, quoted in Jean Charlot, Le Phénomène Gaulliste, (Paris: Editions Fayard, 1969) p. 68

The Communist vote is related to several social behavior which tend to stabilize and reinforce electoral behavior.

A first variable would be interest for politics, as defined in a scale based on "favorable opinions with respect to politics and behavior of political interest" by Guy Michelat.²³ Michelat has analyzed the political interest of the members of each political party on the basis of an opinion poll taken before the first run of the 1962 legislative elections. He attributed a mean grade to each political organization and the results were as follows:

Unified Socialist Party (PSU)	3.27
Communist Party (PCF)	3.24
Socialist Party (SFIO)	2.85
Gaullist Party (UNR)	2.66
Christian Democracy (MRP)	2.38
Abstentionists	1.90

Another variable would be religious feeling. In France, there is a strong correlation between religious practice and feeling and partisan identification. The detachment from the Church characterizes the whole French Left while the majority of the Right shows a strong participant attitude. As shown in the following table, the Communist electorate is the one which practices the least.

Table 3.1

Vote Intention (1962)	Catholic			Without Religion	Other Religion
	Regular Practice	Occasional Practice	No Practice		
Communist	3	17	46	32	2
Socialist	8	36	41	12	3
Center (MRP)	40	37	18	3	3
Gaullist	28	42	22	4	4
Don't know	18	45	22	11	3

Intensity of Religious Practice in Correlation With Political Orientations

Source: IFOP, Cahiers du Communisme, 12, (1967)

Correlation does not mean causality however, and it is impossible to establish the hypothesis that religious attitude determines political attitude.

Another variable would be the adherence of the whole Communist

electorate to the Communist doctrine as a basis for the vote. For example, in his work, La Conscience Politique Dans La France Contemporaine, Pierre Fougeyrollas draws the following hypothesis:

The faithfulness of the Communist electorate with respect to its Party stems from an affective and intellectual adherence of most voters to the Communist ideological system.²⁴

This hypothesis, however does not seem to correspond to the reality. It seems unlikely that there is a homogeneous Communist consciousness among all or even the majority of Communist voters. Another hypothesis about the political content of Communist vote would thus be more appropriate:

There exists at the center of the Communist electorate a very strong core of militant and revolutionary spirit, deeply attached to the main themes developed by the officials of the Party... A proportion of equal importance, if not greater... vote Communist whereas their general orientations are not different in essence from those observed in other parties.²⁵

Encadrement of the Masses

The Communist Party is a strong structuring factor of the vote.

It also performs a function of "encadrement" of the masses. As Jean Ranger puts it:

If we assess that the French Communist Party is not a party like the other, this is also due to the fact that it has been in present day France the only organized political movement in the full sense of the term.²⁶

The French Communist Party has a strong presence not only among Communist voters but also among sympathizers. In an opinion poll conducted in 1966,²⁷ the question was asked: "Are there Communists among your relatives, friends or acquaintances?" The majority of the individuals who were interviewed said they knew one or more Communist. 87 percent of Communist and 61 percent of Socialist knew at least one Communist in that category.

Moreover, in their work on political socialization in France,²⁸

Charles Roig and Francoise Billon-Grand show that whereas the general pattern is one of basic discontinuity in the transmission of party orientation in French families, stemming principally from the fact that French fathers do not disclose their political orientations, Communist voters are more likely to recall their father's partisanship and thus to develop party loyalty. Another factor of importance resides in the fact that Communist party members who have not maintained their adherence to the Party generally remain at least Communist voters and they constitute a specific kind of sympathizers offering an important link between the core of militants and the mass of voters.

The direct propaganda activity of the French Communist Party is more difficult to discern because it takes various forms, specifically individual form. One can however point out the importance of the annual "fête de l'Humanité" which gathers in September more than half a million of participants in Paris. Each federation of the Party organizes a similar "show" in the same time period throughout France. Another important aspect of the "encadrement" of the masses by the Party refers to the way Communist voters respond to the permanent contribution campaign of the Party. An opinion poll conducted in 1952²⁹ showed that 55 percent of Communist voters had given money to their Party whereas this was true only for 32 percent of Socialist voters and 23 percent of "Républicains Populaires" (i.e. voters of the MRP). The same poll showed that 70 percent of Communist voters had participated in one or more political meetings organized by their Party and 31 percent had sold Communist journals or posted posters for the Party while the same percentage for other parties was always less than 9 percent.

The Party's finances:

At the time of the creation of the French Communist Party, Soviet

directives were as clear as possible with respect to financial matters. According to Trotsky, each party was required to provide financial help if necessary to other parties.

International solidarity would be only a miserable hypocrisy... like the Second International was, if the national sections which can help, would refuse to do it or if on the contrary those which need help would refuse to accept it by fear of the "bourgeois" public opinion.³⁰

The French Communist Party has always had four main sources of contributions:

- contributions from the members
- produce of the permanent national contribution campaign
- earnings from several enterprises
- international help

It is obvious that at the time of its establishment, and until at least the period of the "Front Populaire", the three first categories of earnings apparently could not suffice for the needs of the Party which had to call for the financial help of the Communist International. According to Albert Vassart, the "monthly financial supply coming from the International covered the four-fifths of the monthly budget of the French Party".³¹

However, after World War II, the situation changed greatly. The financial strength of the French Party does not seem to be reliant anymore on the support of the Soviet Union. We possess some indications of the resources of the Party. In 1965, the estimate was:

Table 3.2

Sources	F. F.	U. S. \$
Permanent Contribution Campaign	11,444,000	2,300,000
Sales of Lilies of the Valley	470,000	90,000
Profit Sharing from Representatives	3,500,000	700,000

Table 3.2 (con.)

Source	F. F.	U. S. \$
Annual Show	1,750,000	350,000
Contributions from Members	6,135,000	1,250,000
Total	23,295,000	4,540,000

National Financial Resources of the Communist Party (1965)

Source: G. Rossi Landi, "Le Parti Communiste, Structures, Composition, Moyens d'Action", Le Communisme en France. CFNSP. (Paris: Armand Colin, 1969). p. 206.

An additional source of income for the Party consists of several enterprises it owns (directly or indirectly). Several of them are known to be prosperous (especially import-export enterprises with East European countries and the Soviet Union; the North Europe Bank, etc.).

There are no available figures from which we could determine whether, among the different categories of French Communists, (sympathizers, voters, adherents, militants, or cadres), some participate more actively in the national contribution campaign or contribute a higher amount to the finance of the French Communist Party. However, a study of the Communist press shows that there is a rather clear distinction between faithful readers of l'Humanité (i.e. militants and cadres) and occasional or non-readers (i.e. voters and sympathizers).

The Communist press:

According to Lenin, the creation of a journal should be one of the first tasks to be undertaken by a revolutionary party. The French Communist Party has always put a strong emphasis on its press which is presently composed of:

1. The Parisian daily paper l'Humanité. In 1955, the average daily issue

of l'Humanité was 169,000.³² According to the same source, the daily issue was 192,000 in 1960 and 182,000 in January, 1964. In February, 1965, it was 205,000.

2. Several periodicals, among which the Humanité-Dimanche, Sunday issue of general information, which prints about 450,000 issues; the weekly ideological review France Nouvelle and, La Terre, weekly agricultural paper.

3. Several journals among which the Cahiers du Communisme, Economie et Politique and La Nouvelle Critique.

4. The local Communist press has drastically decreased in the recent past, following the general trend of the French press toward integration. Aside from l'Humanité, there are only three daily regional Communist papers left in existence.³³

5. The last category consists of cell papers which constitute a remarkable propaganda tool:

Cell papers explain, mobilize, organize and guide the political action of the working class.³⁴

Cell papers are in constant development. The following table shows this development for the time period 1963-1967.

Table 3.3

Years	Number of Printed Cell Papers
1963	139
1964	349
1965	657 year of presidential election
1967	550

Number of Printed Cell Papers. Evolution (1963-1967)

Source: G. Rossi Landi, "Structures, Composition...", p. 204

Who reads the Communist press? The population of the readers of l'Humanité is much less numerous than the Communist electorate. In 1965, the number of daily Communist newspapers averaged around 400,000 issues while the Communist electorate represented between 4 millions voters (vote cast for the 1962 elections) and 5 millions (vote cast for the 1967 elections). On the other hand, it seems that the Communist press - weekly journals as well as l'Humanité - is also read by a small minority of non-Communist voters.³⁵ In fact, it appears that the typical reader of l'Humanité is not only a Communist voter but also a cadre or at least a militant of the Party, whereas, the Humanité-Dimanche which is a popular magazine is more likely to be read by the party voter and his family.

L'Humanité is not a journalistic success. The problem of the Communist daily press stems from the double nature of the French Communist Party which is both outside and inside the French Political System. L'Humanité is a paper of general information yet, it is also a party paper and as such, its primary duty is to circulate a specific information. This observation helps to grasp why the Communist press (except the Humanité-Dimanche) could hardly be expected to spread among the bulk of Communist electorate. As Annie Kriegel writes, the Communist press is condemned to remain above all "the daily mirror of the inside circle of the Party".³⁶

The schools of the Party:

The schools of the Communist Party have the primary purpose of forming party leaders. There are three different kinds of schools which correspond to three different levels in the organization of the Party:

- elementary schools with the purpose of formation of new members
- federal schools with the task of training federal leaders
- central schools at the national level, for the formation of national leaders

How many schools? In 1967, the number of schools of the Communist Party was estimated as follows:

Table 3.4

Schools	Number of Schools	Number of Students
Elementary	1,923	16,097
Federal	311	3,480
Central	34	1,286

Number of Schools of the Communist Party (1967)

Source: G. Rossi Landi, "Structures, Composition...", p. 203

The purpose of these schools (and especially at the federal and national levels) is to form professionals in the sense of Lenin's "professional revolutionaries". This initial aim of the schools of the Party is recalled by Etienne Fajon, former responsible for the FCP's schools, when he speaks of there educational purpose:

The Communist Party needs leaders for the class struggle and not "book worms".³⁷

The basis of the instruction given in those schools deals with history, Marxist theory and the basic issues of the present world. For example, at the level of elementary schools, the program of study involved the following topics in 1963:³⁸

- social classes and economic exploitation
- the fight for peace
- national role of the working class
- the French Communist Party
- the ideal for Communists

In 1956, five topics were proposed in the central schools:³⁹

- the place of the Soviet Union in the international system
- the pauperization
- the different forms of transition to socialism
- the prospect for peaceful coexistence

It is important to point out that the majority of the teachers in these schools are not professional professors but Communist militants and leaders. The instruction given is not a standard instruction, it is rather a specialized knowledge transmitted by specialists to future specialists.

Moreover, the students who attend those schools are not voluntary students, they are selected by their cells or federations. For those who are chosen, to go to school is viewed as an honor, a mission and a responsibility. The major criterium for selection seems to be the appartenance to the working class. Thus, in 1967, 41 percent of the students in federal schools came from enterprise cells.⁴⁰ As Annie Kriegel puts it:

This preference for students of working class origin gives to the schools of the Party a cardinal function: to prime the pump from which the worker-student, after having learned to learn, to read a text, the technique of writing, will acquire the basis which would allow him later to develop his information and reflection.⁴¹

It can be said that the schools of the French Communist Party fulfill the function of maintaining the social purity of the party leadership as well as transmitting from one generation to the other the Communist tradition.

Functions as Consequences of Patterned Actions of the French Communist Party

In its performance of functions-patterned actions, the French Communist Party must be considered both as a group of inside elected representatives acting within the French Parliament and, in non-parliamentary actions,

as an outside organization performing diverse activities through local political officials, trade unions and other mass organizations. In the following section, we will analyze the activities of Communist representatives in Parliament and, of local Communist officials in municipalities. We believe that in both kinds of action, the FCP not only contributes to the French Political System but also largely shows a conservative image.

Activity in Parliament and in Municipalities

How influential is the French Communist Party in the making of public policy in the French Parliament? What form does the activity of Communist deputies take? Robert de Jouvenel once wrote that:

There is less difference between two deputies when one is a revolutionary and the other is not, than between two revolutionaries when one of them is a deputy and the other is not.⁴²

According to the instructions given by the Second Congress of the Communist International in 1925, each deputy was to conceive himself not like a "legislator seeking for a common language with other legislators but like a political agitator sent by the Party to the enemy in order to apply there the decisions of the Party".⁴³ In fact, it is the reverse that has become true. As we will see, the attitude of French deputies in the "Assemblée Nationale" does not stem anymore from the principles announced by the Third International in 1925. On the contrary, the FCP follows the rules of the game and is sometimes favorable to measures decided by the French Government in the Parliament.

Before we start analyzing the activity of Communist deputies, we have to summarize briefly some constitutional traits of the present French parliamentary regime. Two kinds of bills are distinguished according to

whether they are brought before the Assembly by the Government (in this case, one speaks of a "projet de loi") or, by one member of the Parliament (in that case, one speaks of a "proposition de loi"). The ratio of "propositions de loi" as compared to "projets de loi" is about 1 to 7. Both can be amended either by the Government or by members of the Parliament during the legislative process. Besides its legislative power, the French Assembly also has the power of information. Each deputy can ask the Government for information either by means of "written question" (i.e. the governmental answer is written and officially published in the "Journal Officiel de la République Française") or, by means of oral questions (i.e. the answer is given orally by the member of the Government to whom it was asked).

The Communist parliamentary group brings "propositions de loi" and written or oral questions before the French Assembly, as well as other parliamentary groups. What is the volume of Communist interventions at the "Assemblée Nationale" and what are the categories of these interventions? The following analysis is based on the findings of Herbert Maisl who analyzed the attitude of the French Communist parliamentary group in the "Assemblée Nationale" for the second legislature of the Fifth Republic (1962-1967).⁴⁴

Volume of Communist interventions:

The following table retraces the "propositions" brought by the entire National Assembly compared with the "propositions" brought by the Communist parliamentary group. The "propositions" are classified according to their object. The Communist interventions in the French Assembly follow the general pattern of interventions.

Table 3.5

Object of the Proposition	Entire Assembly	Communist Group Number	Communist Group Percent
Social Affairs	169	30	18
Legislation and Justice	151	15	10
Equipment and Housing	73	8	11
Economy and Industry	66	11	16.5
Agriculture	46	1	2
Local Communities	27	6	22
Number of Deputies	487	41	9

Volume of Communist Interventions in the French National Assembly during One Legislative Session

Source: Pierre Ferrari and Herbert Maisl, Les Groupes Communistes aux Assemblées Parlementaires Française et Italienne, 1962-1967, (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1968), p. 162

Both following tables retrace the interventions (under the form of written and oral questions) of the Communist parliamentary group as compared to the interventions of the entire French Assembly during the same period.

Table 3.6

Communist Group	"Assemblée Nationale"
Social Affairs	Economy and Finance
Education	Social Affairs

Table 3.6 (con.)

Communist Group	"Assemblée Nationale"
Equipment	Education
Economy and Finance	Equipment
Interior (police)	Agriculture
Agriculture	Army
Army	Interior (police)

Classification in Decreasing Order of Written Questions Asked by the Communist Parliamentary Group and the Entire Assembly, According to their Volume. (1962-1967)

Source: H. Maisl, Les Groupes Communistes, p. 164.

Table 3.7

Communist Group	"Assemblée Nationale"
Social Affairs	Agriculture
Equipment	Social Affairs
Economy	Equipment
Agriculture	Education
Industry	Economy
Education	Interior (police)
Interior (police)	Industry

Classification in Decreasing Order of Oral Questions Asked by the Communist Parliamentary Group and the Entire Assembly, According to their Volume. (1962-1967)

Source: H. Maisl, Les Groupes Communistes, p. 170.

If we place Communist interventions in time, we can observe that they follow the general trend (it increases in volume during the second session each year because it corresponds to the discussion and the vote of the budget in October—November).

Sessions	Number of Interventions	
	Communist Group	Entire Assembly
First 1963	79	331
Second	113	705
First 1964	45	262
Second	113	685
First 1965	56	300
Second	88	632
First 1966	69	357
Second	100	803

Compared Interventions (Propositions and Questions) of the Communist Parliamentary Group and the Entire Assembly Placed in Time. (1962-1967)

Source: H. Maisl, Les Groupes Communistes, p. 182.


If we analyze the Communist interventions according to the nature of the discussions, we can see that the Communist trend tends to follow the general trend here also. The examples which follow have been selected because, according to the author they represent the two cases where the Communist curve was the most distant from the general curve. (See figures 3.2 and 3.3).

Content of Communist interventions:

If the volume and the trend of its interventions in the French Assembly do not seem to single out the Communist parliamentary group one can ask whether the content of these interventions differs from the content of the interventions of other groups. What is the attitude of Communist deputies in the discussion of the law?

Communist deputies are generally hostile to the "projets de loi" brought before the Parliament by the Government. However, they adopt a policy of


Figure 3.2



Activity of the National Assembly Measured in Number of Columns in the "Journal Officiel" — Economy and Industry — 1962-1967

Source: H. Maisl, Les Groupes Communistes, p.190

Figure 3.3



Activity of the National Assembly Measured in Number of Columns in the "Journal Officiel" — Agriculture — 1962-1967 . Same source

presence which is observable especially when fiscal or social issues are discussed.

In the discussion of finance bills, Communist representatives are not reluctant to protest against the low level of income of civil servants or against the volume of loans made to local communities, which is judged too small.⁴⁵

However, the Communist parliamentary group has voted several governmental "projets de loi" during the 1962-1967 legislature into effect.

- voted for the creation of the National Savings Fund (a sort of Social Security plan for independent workers).
- voted for several projects aimed at the defense of certain categories of people (e.g. freelance journalists, insurance for artists, National Fund Against Unemployment, etc.).

Moreover, some "projets de loi" have been voted for by the Communist parliamentary group because they were similar to propositions brought up by the group.

- imprescriptibility of genocide
- adoption regulations, etc.

Municipal communism:

What must be pointed out at this point is that the FCP mainly declares itself in favor of policies centered around one specific theme: the defense of certain social categories. But, it shows a profound reluctance toward general social reforms which have always been originated by someone else rather than by Communists. The nationalizations, the Social Security, and the establishment of shop stewards or the mensualization of salaries have almost always led to negative verdicts from Communist officials who are suspicious of structural modifications in work relationships on the ground that these social transformations would lead the working class to integrate more fully in the established society and participate with the Capitalist organization of that society.

This reluctance toward deep social changes has led the Communist Party

to undertake a rather conservative action at the municipal level. The French Communist Party "rules" more than one thousand municipalities in a way which does not differ deeply from other municipalities. In fact, Communists seem to be concerned, above all, by short term social and economic efficiency (erection of popular housings, multiplication of primary and secondary schools, centers for entertainment, etc.). This action in the short run does not take into account the real problems of our times which are more qualitative than quantitative .

Functions as Consequences of the Nature of the FCP

A third type of statement within the orientation of functionalism refers to the nature of political parties and what effects stem from this nature. We think that the hypothesis proposed by Theodore Lowi in his study, Party, Policy and Constitution in America,⁴⁷ is an illustration of this trend of functionalism. Lowi asserts the functions of a party in democracies in terms of the following general and abstract proposition.

Parties in a democracy institutionalize , channel * and socialize conflicts over control of the regime.⁴⁸

Lowi proposes to oppose two ideal types of political parties, depending on how they perform this function which could be called the function of "institutionalization" of conflicts or "legitimization" of the system. There are parties which perform "constituent" or "constitutional" functions in the system; constituent being defined as "necessary in the formation of the whole, forming, composing and making an essential part."⁴⁹

* A general function described in such terms will meet the requirements of a system conceived as a "tension management". (see Wilbert E. Moore; Social Change. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1963) p. 10 and 11).

In other words, constituent parties act within the frame defined by the norms and values of the regime; their purpose is essentially to represent electorally the whole population of a nation and thus to avoid or minimize ideological conflicts. According to Lowi, the American parties which are generally conservative and unlikely to innovate politically belong to this type. On the other hand, there are parties which perform "programmatic" or "policy" functions. These programmatic parties which are to be found in European political systems contribute to the institutionalization of conflicts by proposing policy programs to be enforced by legal and peaceful means. As Lowi states:

The constituent thesis...leaves us with a party system that splits regime off from policy. It leaves us with parties that virtually exist to keep leadership succession and the constitutional structure separate from the actual settlement of issues. Just as...programmatic parties, like Europe's, tend to centralize authority so programmatic parties tend to democratize regimes by keeping legitimacy and policy in close association.⁵⁰

What Lowi has in mind is clear; given the nature of American parties, certain consequences have followed just like other consequences stem from the different nature of most European political parties. Despite the wording of the functional statement, the subject is not parties but the nature of parties.

We can thus locate political parties in Western democracies on a continuum based on the functional consequences of the nature of these parties (Lowi's particular emphasis on the legitimacy-policy association is used). This scheme indicates that the stronger the emphasis on legitimacy (i.e. the broader the range of political issues for the party), the more critical the political activity of that party. Socialist parties, located at the bottom of the scheme consider that political activity involves not only problem solving and goal attainment, without reference to the legitimacy of the system, but also the critique of the goals proposed to the society and of certain

norms and values of that society.

Toward a total separation	Constituent Parties	Republican Party	(U. S.)
		Democratic Party	(U. S.)
		Gaullist Party	(France)
		Christian Democratic Party	(Germany)
Association Equilibrium	Constituent Programmatic Parties	Conservative Party	(England)
		Labor Party	(England)
		S. P. D.	(Germany)
Strong emphasis on legitimacy	Programmatic Parties	Socialist Party	(Italy)
		Socialist Party	(France)

It is tempting to place the Communist Party at the very bottom of the scheme for it presents a radical critique of the whole established society. For while other parties attempt to thin out their differences, presenting almost identical political platforms, the Communist Party claims that it is the party of the working class, fighting for the abolition of Capitalist regime and the realization of another political and social order with different values. No one expects a real political overthrow if Democrats succeed Republicans and conversely in the United States nor if the Labor Party succeeds the Conservative Party in England and vice versa. In France and in Italy however, deep changes are expected if the Communists come into power. The Communist Party not only permanently criticizes the actions of all "bourgeois" governments but moreover, this critique is a systematic critique stemming from a pre-established theory. Communist opposition therefore has a much greater amplitude than the opposition of other parties. However, the question has been asked whether the French Communist Party really want to take over political power. Giovanni Sartori once wrote about the Italian Communist Party:

We thus come to the uncomfortable paradox that the Communist Party would make for an excellent opposition if it were an opposition, i.e. a possible alternative government. But since it would replace the system as well as the people, the net result is that the country is deprived of its best potential elites—which fall under the Communist pole of attraction—and cannot really profit from the mechanism of alternation to power...⁵¹

Is this judgement also valid with respect to the French Communist Party? On one hand, it seems that the French Communist Party is hardly a party confined in sterile opposition, quite the contrary, it is a wealthy party which has all the power that it needs (i.e. control of the largest trade union, cohesive membership, strong organization, etc.) in order to become a political opposition performing a function of authentic political relief. On the other hand, it appears that the Communist Party cannot (and will not) take over power and prefers to keep itself in the performance of what G. Lavau has called the "tribunitial function".

THE TRIBUNITIAL FUNCTION

The position held by the FCP in regard to the French Political System has been described by some scholars as a situation where it is possible for a revolutionary or insurgent political organization to organize legally within a hostile system but where it cannot hope to overthrow the existing social and political order. From this situation has been forged the concept of "tribunitial function." In a significant article, Georges Lavau suggests that the FCP has the function—at least latent if not manifest—of organizing and defending the plebeian social classes, which feel that they are outside the process of the French Political System, and giving them a feeling of strength and confidence.⁵²

The concept of "tribunitial function" has been forged by Georges Lavau

in recalling the "tribunus plebis" who, in ancient Rome, was a magistrate appointed to protect and defend the interests and rights of the plebeians against violation by the patricians and later the "nobilitas" (that is the Roman political class constituted by magistrates of senatorial rank and their descendants).

According to Lavau, the performance of the "tribunitial function" (i.e. defense of the dissatisfied) requires the following conditions:

The performance of this function requires the existence of sufficiently numerous and homogeneous social groups incompletely integrated within the social, cultural and political systems; holding a position of everlasting inferiority vis a vis the channels of access to political representation. Tribunitial function...implies an institution [tribunes in the Roman Republic] or a political organization [party] that speaks in the name of these social categories and that has the power to block—or at least to impede—the decision of those who control the political decision making process; this being justified only by the defense of the interests of the poorest. A political system allows the performance of the "tribunitial function" only if the norms and structures of that system concede a legitimacy to political defense. In other words, the system must be "aware of its failure", conceding the need to resort to some other process of defense in order to adjust its own shortcomings. By the same token, these harmed social categories will want to help themselves rather than revolt or remain passive.

The "tribunitial function" requires that it be impossible for these social categories, to overthrow radically (either legally or in a revolutionary manner) the existing social order. If this condition is not fulfilled, the aforementioned social groups—and more precisely, those who direct their action—will be more likely to engage in a less defensive action, attempting to realize the transformation they wish. The "tribunitial function" stems from the intermediary situation where it is possible to organize legally but where the overthrow of the existing order is hopeless. Today, the FCP would repudiate the "tribunitial function" if it had the certainty that a leftist government would achieve socialism with its participation. Without such a certainty, the FCP remains carefully the party of the defense of the dissatisfied.⁵³

The definition of "tribunitial function" is not a truly operational definition. No clear and objectively applicable criteria of what Lavau considers as "tribunitial function" is provided. The requirement for

operational definition states the necessity for indicating more or less unambiguously the nature of the circumstances under which the term is to be used. A concept is defined only by the terms of its definition. If it does not state these terms clearly, so that we know when we do or when we do not have an instance of it, then the concept may be criticized legitimately as being inadequately defined.

Georges Lavau includes a hypothesis in his definition of "tribunitial function" which consists of the impossibility to overthrow radically the existing social order. He also defines the concept of "tribunitial function" to include almost all the instances of the French Communist Party. But, by doing the latter, the boundaries of the concept begin to disappear and no room is left for hypothesis. Thus, in order to define operationally and in a limited way the concept of tribunitial function, we will provide two variables or indirect indicators.

Operationalization

There seems to be two requisites for the performance of the tribunitial function; that is (1) a group of people in the political system who are dissatisfied and desire to transform there situation and, (2) a political structure that speaks in the name of these people with a certain degree of effectiveness. Obviously, it is necessary to define more precisely both requisites, otherwise, our definition of the tribunitial function would involve almost all the instances of national political life.*

* Starting from such a broad definition, one could assert that the French Parliament (as a structure) performs the tribunitial function since it claims to speak in the name of the French people who are, obviously, dissatisfied with their fate. Similarly, one could speak of the performance of the tribunitial function as performed by an organization as La Raza Unida which speaks in the name of dissatisfied Mexican-Americans.

In our attempt to define operationally the item "political structure", we will first point out that such a structure should be an organization (pressure group, political party) rather than an institution (Parliament, Court). This organization must speak in the name of certain groups of people. This variable can also be analyzed in terms of size, strength and cohesion of the organization which performs the tribunitial function. Size will define the percent of votes and of representatives (in the case of a political party) which should meet a minimum requirement. Generally, the geographical size of the area of implantation of the organization would cover a minimal part of a country (at least one tenth or one fifth).*

Strength is determined by the stability of the electorate (in the case of a party). Such requirements as the existence of a regular national press, or of a permanent structure would also be met by the political organization for the performance of the tribunitial function. Cohesion, another factor, involves what the social, ethnic, religious, etc. composition of the electorate, membership and leadership is and rises the question; does the leadership of the organization speak in the name of its followers?

In order to fulfill the tribunitial function, an organization must be effective (i.e. what Lavau refers to as the "power to impede decision"). The operationalization of the idea is possible by using the concept of "political access". Access describes a continuum of behavioral situations; at one end, a group which has no access (and no power) regardless of whether it perceives an interest or not; in the middle, a group which has effective access (but this does not mean it has power) and, at the end, a group which

* Can we speak of tribunitial function when dealing with the defense of local "moonshiners" by a specialized pressure group?

has privileged access. The performance of the tribunitial function implies an effective access of the group and the exercise of political power (at least negative) by this group.

The effective access of a group to politics is a function of the internal characteristics of the group, which include, as mentioned before, cohesion, strength and size. We can add to these variables the resources of the group (leadership skill and financial status). Another internal characteristic would be the "appropriateness of organization" or the degree of group organization as a functioning communication system which is designed to gather information and mobilize supports.⁵⁴

A second indicator for effective access of the group to politics would be the strategic position of the group in the society. This variable can be measured first, according to the degree of conformity of the group to the rules of the game, defined as the "symbolic norms... that govern traditional forms of political competition".⁵⁵ On the one hand, the group which performs the tribunitial function could consider the rules of the game as part of the object of the competition (and this is the case of the FCP) but on the other hand, the leaders and members of the group will conform to a certain extent to those rules of the game. In this perspective, two conditions at least seem necessary for the performance of the tribunitial function; (1) the group attached to the defense of the dissatisfied must compete within the established political framework and, (2) the organization performing the tribunitial function must and will consider the other interest affiliations of its members or followers in order to grow in size and maintain internal cohesion.*

* This, if we assert with David Truman⁵⁶ and the partisans of the group theory that the average citizen belongs to a number of different groups.

A third requirement would be the legality of the political structure performing the tribunitial function. This variable refers to the idea that the society in which the given political structure operates is democratic. One way of operationalizing this indicator would be to take Robert Dahl's concept of "polyarchy"⁵⁷ and several of its conditions (freedom to form and join organizations, right to run for public office, freedom of expression).

The second variable which refers to the "group of dissatisfied people" can be defined in relation to the following indicators; non-complete integration, dissatisfaction (or alienation) and, the desire to help themselves.

We will define operationally the term integration by using Karl Deutsch's scheme of "communicative integration". Integration is defined by Deutsch as "the attainment within a territory of a sense of community and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure for a long time, dependable expectations of peaceful change among its population"⁵⁸ Integration is not an antonym of conflict but it describes a situation in which channels of communication and linkages between persons or groups are open and used by all. Fragmentation is the opposite of integration. The concept of tribunitial function can be defined in terms of partial assimilation (to what extent are there common languages, common cultures and common sets of symbols?) and partial mobilization (limited access to the mass media, limited ability to national participation).

A second variable would refer to political alienation (dissatisfaction) which can be defined following Gabriel Almond's scheme,⁵⁹ as a combination of high frequency of awareness about the political system (cognitive orientation) along with a high frequency of negative feelings with respect to affective and evaluative orientations.

A third requisite would be one of high capability to act together. To evaluate the extent to which both requisites of alienation and capability to act together are realized, we could use the index provided by F. Parkin.⁶⁰ To a set of questions asked, responses are of the type agree—disagree. Supporting values are labeled "dominant" and disruptive values "deviant". If 75 percent of the responses agree with a dominant value, we have a "dominant consensus". If 75 percent of the responses agree with a deviant value, we have a "deviant consensus". A deviant consensus in the following questionnaire (see next page) would indicate a homogeneous partially integrated population.

Hypothesis

In attempting to define the concept of tribunitial function, we have been confronted with some major difficulties. (1) Lavau does not give us a truly operational definition of the function. No clear and objectively applicable criteria of what he considers as tribunitial function is provided. (2) By defining the concept to include almost all the instances of the French Communist Party, the boundaries of the concept disappear and no room is left for hypothesis. (3) Lavau includes what seems to be an hypothesis in his definition of tribunitial function (i.e. such a function requires the impossibility for harmed social categories to overthrow radically the existing social order).

A fourth critique could be pointed out; there seems to be a tendency to mix structural and functional criteria in Lavau's definition. This tendency, typical of all common sense thinking, has been criticized by Fred Riggs who wrote:

QUESTIONNAIRE

Do you agree or disagree with the following statements?
(Image of society)

Big business has too much power.	agree...	disagree...
Upper class always tries to exploit the working class.	agree...	disagree...
The laws favor the rich.	agree...	disagree...
Opposition between social classes are disappearing.	agree...	disagree...
Everyone has a chance in the courts of law.	agree...	disagree...
Management and workers are a team.	agree...	disagree...

Do you agree with the following statements?
(Social stratification system)

Luck and influence determines who gets ahead.	agree...	disagree...
It is hard for the ambitious to get ahead.	agree...	disagree...
Cynical factors determine promotions in organizations.	agree...	disagree...
Ability determines who gets ahead.	agree...	disagree...
Hard work (not luck or influence) determines who gets ahead.	agree...	disagree...
Laws are fair.	agree...	disagree...

Do you agree with the following statements?
(Capability of action together).

Nothing you do has any effect on politics.	agree...	disagree...
No point being interested in politics.	agree...	disagree...
No possibility of exercising political control.	agree...	disagree...
Politicians represent the general interest.	agree...	disagree...
Most people can be trusted.	agree...	disagree...
Government does what it can to the best of its ability.	agree...	disagree...

Do you agree with the following statements?
(Image of political efficacy).

Government is always on the side of the unions and against management.	agree...	disagree...
The working class should stick together in order to get ahead.	agree...	disagree...
Supporting working class action in a protest.	agree...	disagree...
Government should do more for housing, education and unemployment.	agree...	disagree...
Large inequalities are wrong.	agree...	disagree...
Class membership is more important than national citizenship.	agree...	disagree...

A coat might be defined functionally in terms of how it is worn, or structurally in terms of its shape. However, a coat may be thrown over the body like a blanket, for example. Moreover, a blanket may [also] be worn the way a coat is... A strict structural definition would specify the shape of the coat or blanket as flat and sleeveless. Hypotheses, not definitions, could then assert that coats are normally worn and blankets used as bed coverings, leaving open for further explanation the exceptional circumstances in which coats are thrown over sleeping persons and blankets used to drape walking men.⁶¹

Thus, rather than defining a function in terms of structure, or a structure in terms of function, the researcher has to show that; (1) the FCP fulfills the conditions which have been enumerated in the item "political structure" and (2) that a group of people meets the requirements enumerated in the item "group of dissatisfied people". Then and only then, can the researcher draw his hypothesis.

There is no need for assessing that the requirements of size, strength and cohesion have been met by the French Communist Party. In relation with the variable "access to politics" we have seen in the first chapter that the FCP has legitimized to a certain extent the French Political System.

Legality of the French Communist Party:

In France, opposition is scarcely restricted at all by legislation. According to the fourth article of the Constitution of the Fifth Republic (1958), "Political parties and groups assist in the expression of the franchise. They are formed and conduct their activities freely. They must respect the principles of national sovereignty and democracy". This sentence, rather obscure in itself, has never had to be given precise meaning since no party has ever been accused of violating it. Although radio and television are largely under governmental control, the free exercise of opposition by the press is without doubt better respected than in the large proportion of the other pluralistic democracies since the right to question

the validity of the regime and even the values on which the political society rests, is completely accepted.*

Moreover, the recruitment of high officials is based solely on their capacity. For instance, if the Government has the right to determine the list of candidates competing for entrance to l'Ecole Nationale d'Administration, it cannot invoke the political opinion of the candidate in order to prevent his access to the public service.**

Communist strategy rests on the peaceful conquest of political power by parliamentary means as well as on social movements organized by mass-organizations. With respect to the last aspect of Communist strategy, it should be pointed out that the right to strike is guaranteed by the preamble of the Constitution. "The right of strike may be exercised within the framework of the laws that govern it". Such laws are practically non-existent. One of the most recent (1963) and most discussed is a law "relative to certain forms of strike in the public service", which imposes a public notice of five days, but has rarely been respected. Moreover, the total defeat of the procedure of requisition utilized against French miners in 1963 has shown that the right to strike is practically unlimited whether it is a question of opposing the state in its role as an employer or the state as a representative of the general interest.

* After the May 1968 events several radical small groupings were outlawed as were their publications. However, these political organizations could hardly be considered as political parties.

** In 1954, a decision of the Council of State annuled a refusal to admit five Communist candidates to l'Ecole Nationale d'Administration on the ground that the administration could not invoke adherence to any political party and even less to the opinions of the candidate.

There are several reasons why resorting to strikes and sometimes means of violence has become normal and legitimate in France. They all stem from the numerical and financial weaknesses of organized labor groups. Given these weaknesses the power to mobilize supporters constitutes the essential criterion of their representativeness. Thus, many strikes and demonstrations are undertaken solely to exhibit the influence and therefore, the representativeness of the group that organizes them. Here we can state that the CGT does not escape this pattern. In the United States, labor unions and pressure groups that are financially or economically powerful can obtain results by affecting the finances of the State. In France, demonstrations and strikes have the purpose of seeking satisfaction for the demands of a group threatening disorder or impeding the functioning of the economy.

Aside from the need to strike in order to prove that the union is strong, another obstacle of the organized use of the threat of strike lies in the internal division of trade unions and the fact that labor organizations are not on equal footing with business groups in negotiation with the administration. As Alfred Grosser puts it:

Whatever the orientation of top officials may be between them and managers...there is a community of background, language, and intellectual attitude that creates a certain amount of understanding and sympathy for the managers.⁶²

Who Are The Dissatisfied?

French Communist officials claim that their Party is the party of the working class. To what extent is this true? Can the French working class be considered as meeting the requirements for our variable "group of dissatisfied people"?

At the level of political behavior, there is less cohesion than diversity within the French working class. We have already shown that only

half of the Communist vote (46 percent in 1965) is a worker's vote. If we retain 4 million as an approximate evaluation of the number of Communist voters and 15 million as the number of French workers, we can conclude that only a small percent of the French working class vote Communist (1/7). Moreover, less than half of the French workers vote for the Left.

Table 3.9

Year	Percent of workers voting for Left in Presidential elections
1965	52%
1969	45%

Left Working Class Vote at Presidential Elections. (1965 and 1969).

Source: Jean Charlot, Le Phénomène Gaulliste, p. 74

According to IFOP polls, in 1967, 30 percent of the French workers declared that they would vote for the Gaullist Party (31% in 1968).

At the level of other behavior however, there seems to be a greater cohesion within the French working class. Several attitudes, such as authoritarianism and pragmatism, are typical of the workers. During the May-June 1968 strikes, of among a group of four labor and student unions the CGT was far more inclined to focus on material revindications than were the other organizations. (See tables 3.9 and 3.10).

It is still true that the French Communist Party is the party of the working class but, we must add that a strong proportion of Communist voters is composed of non-workers, mainly unprivileged social categories such as peasants, primary school teachers, artisans or retired people. It seems that the Communist Party seeks to attract the support of these "laissés-pour-compte de l'expansion".

Table 3.10

Organizations	Demands			N
	Material	Social	Syndical Rights	
CGT	80%		20%	86
CFDT (leftist Union)	36%	10%	30%	352
Comités d'Action (Secondary Schools)	55%	3%	10%	31
Student Organization	25%	3%	26%	37

Frequency of Different Categories of Demands in 1968.

Source: Claude Durand, "Ouvriers et Techniciens en 1968" Grèves Revendicatives ou Politiques?, (Paris: Editions Anthropos, 1971). p.118.

Table 3.11.

Organizations	Demands		N
	Concrete Policy	Critique of Structures	
CGT	45%	19%	86
CFDT	37%	34%	402
Comités d'Action	30%	59%	178
Student	29%	47%	233

Concrete Versus Abstract Demands in 1968.

Source: Claude Durand, "Ouvriers et Techniciens en 1968" Grèves Revendicatives ou Politiques?, (Paris: Editions Anthropos, 1971). p. 122.

Defense of the Dissatisfied:

We have already seen how the FCP focuses on the defense of its actual and potential followers. The theme of these defenses is one of the most

constant refrains in Communist speeches and programs.⁶³ Moreover, the public opinion perceives the French Communist Party as expressing the discontent and defending the "little people". In a 1962 opinion poll⁶⁴ the FCP was seen by those polled primarily as a "caretaker" for the workers.

Among the following political parties which one according to you cares most about:

	C.F.	SFIO	UNR	MRP	Indépendants	No response
The defense of the workers.	32	19	9	3	4	26
The economic development.	9	9	29	5	7	34
The defense of public education.	27	27	4	2	1	29
The struggle against the OAS.	22	4	37	1	-	33

Source: IFOP, 1962, M. Fichelet, et al. "l'Image du Parti Communiste Français d'Après les Sondages IFOP." Le Communisme en France. p.268.

In 1968, the FCP was still conceived as focusing on the expression of discontent. For to the question: among the following what is the most important reason which leads French voters to vote for the Communist Party?, the following responses were given.

Answers	Communist voters	Socialist voters	Total
Because they want the establishment of a Communist regime.	18	7	9%
Because Communism represents an effective opposition.	35	27	18%
Because of general discontent.	38	52	45%
No opinion.	9	14	28%

Source: Nouvel Observateur, February 6-21, 1968.

Hypothesis and Explanation:

Our hypothesis will take the following form: requirement (1) effective political organization (as it has been operationalized) will meet requirement (2) group of people (as it has been operationalized) under certain conditions in order to produce the tribunitial function.

There are two inter-related ways to show that both requirements are met and each way (or hypothesis) emphasizes a particular condition. The first hypothesis focuses on the evolution of the French political culture. As pointed out by Gabriel Almond⁶⁵ continental European systems (France, Italy, Germany, and to a lesser extent the Scandinavian and Low countries) have had for a long time specific political sub-cultures. Three characteristics were found in those systems; (1) that the organized political manifestation of these fragmented political cultures took the form of sects rather than political parties and political affiliation were more of an act of faith than of agency. (2) The political role structure in these areas was characterized by a "general alienation from the political market". The normatively consistent was the "militant" who remaining in the confines of his political sub-culture continually reaffirmed his special norms. (3) The roles were embedded in the sub-cultures and tended to constitute separate sub-systems of roles and the same pattern could be observed among the Catholic or Socialist sub-cultures.

Western political systems have then seen a transformation of their political culture. The bases for such a transformation were essentially the extension of the suffrage along with the general spread of the means of communication. This transformation contributed to the breakdown of the old patterns characterized by the existence of separate political sub-cultures without creating the necessary new political structures. As Mark Kesselman

puts it:

The vast increase in political participation which has been brought about before the establishment of stable and effective institutions, has had for effect in the public opinion, a wide movement of disillusion and alienation with respect to the established order; this movement was of great advantage for the French Communist Party.⁶⁶

The alienated categories have given their vote to the FCP which presented itself as the 'heir apparent' to the myth of the French Revolution. According to this explanation the FCP fulfills the role which had been performed by the Socialist parties before World War I. As R. Tierski states:

Since it appears as the most "revolutionary" political formation in the Twentieth Century, the French Communist Party has inherited the clientèle of protestors and revolutionaries in idea but not in action...This clientele [gives] it support to the Party because of its anti-system character.⁶⁷

If we turn to the other hypothesis, we have to examine the question of the contribution of a party to its political system. A party can seek to control the existing government (this purpose being considered as "normal" for a political party). Such a party will be considered as contributing to the perpetuance and adaptation of the political system. The tribunitial function, neither revolution nor total contribution to a system, will be considered as abnormal if performed by a revolutionary party. Hypothesis (2) will take the following form: a revolutionary party will perform the (abnormal) tribunitial function under circumstance n. In order to verify this hypothesis, we have to define what we mean by the circumstance n under which this party will perform the tribunitial function.

The Western political systems have seen a transformation of their party systems in the period following the Second World War. Particularly, of the old type mass-parties who abandoning attempts at the intellectual and moral "encadrement" of the masses are turning more fully to the electoral scene trying to exchange effectiveness in depth for a wider audience and

a more immediate electoral success. The French and Italian Communist parties are excluding themselves from the almost universal phenomenon that constitutes the conversion to catch-all parties in Western Europe. Nevertheless, an adaptation is necessary in order to keep the confidence of the voters "under present conditions of spreading secular and mass-consumer goods orientation with shifting and less obstrusive class-lines".⁶⁸

Those parties, in contrast with their competitors working within the confines of the existing political order, cannot make a virtue out of necessity and adapt themselves fully to the new style of catch-all peoples' parties. This conservatism does not cost them the confidence of their regular crops of voters. On the other hand, the continued renewal of confidence on election day does not involve an intimate enough bond to utilize as a basis for major political operations.⁶⁹

From this situation of partial adaptation stems the performance of the "tribunitial function".

Evaluation of the Adequacy of the Concept of Tribunitial Function

What Georges Lavau calls the "tribunitial function" has for years been an anthem for French Communists under the name of "defense of demands". To a certain extent it is possible to see the French Communist Party as a lobby whose clientele consists of blue-collar workers and small people. To what extent does this defensive function contribute to the integration of the FCP and its followers to the dominant system?

According to Lavau, the answer is that the Communist Party restricts its action to the performance of this function and this function alone. In other terms, the French Communist Party has become a reformist party, it seeks only to remain the manager of the workers' interests and thus, has given up its revolutionary goal.

This concept of the FCP can be challenged. In the first place, even

though French Communists are trying to deserve the title of best defenders of the interests of the workers, this does not constitute their exclusive concern. One could also assert for that matter that the major concern of the the French Communist Party is to become a party of government. The 1972 common program with the non-Communist Left and the lasting contacts between Communist, Socialist and Radical leaderships in the recent past seem to prove wrong the argument according to which the Communists are not ready or not even willing to take over power in coalition with Socialists.

Moreover, those who sustain the argument according to which the FCP is now a reformist party underestimate the fact that Communists have always shown a profound suspicion with respect to "class collaboration". A significant sign of this reluctance is the attitude of the French Communist Party towards social reforms. In fact, Communists consider that general social reforms infringe upon their exclusive task which is the construction of the "perfect Socialist" society.

Thus, the formula "defense of the interests of the working class" must be understood in its most restrictive meaning; it is a "defensive defense"; a defense which is aimed at preserving what has been obtained and preventing a possible competition in relation with the role of best defender, a role that the FCP monopolizes jealously, and finally, making sure that the gains proposed or achieved do not compromise the FCP or other mass-organizations with the established power.

What do we mean then when we say that the French Communist Party by performing the tribunitian function contributes to the functioning of the French Political System? Do we imply that French Communists have been seduced or corrupted by the bourgeois environment? Do we mean that they accept the established regime and would follow its norms and rules in case

they would take over power? No. To be sure, there is no doubt that the French Communist Party fulfills this function and contributes partially to the French Political System. Such a contribution takes the form of the entry of Communists into the government, if the electoral and parliamentary conditions allow it. This contribution also stems from the fact that French Communists seek to penetrate all the structures of the dominant society and to conquer as many places as possible in these structures. But, contrary to the evolution of the Social Democratic movement, Communist participation in the dominant power coexists with the preservation of the originality and the exteriority of the Communist Movement as it is.

CONCLUSION

We have tried to show that there is good reason to adopt the thesis according to which the French Communist Party should be analyzed at two different levels corresponding to two different poles of the Party. Of course, both poles are related and it is sometimes difficult to clearly distinguish them but, they must not be confused. The first level, that of the contact with the French Political System (and also with the International Communist Movement) corresponds to the aspects of the FCP that make it a party like the others. However, the FCP must be conceptualized also as a counter-community with specific purposes and activities which correspond to a second level of analysis or pole, related to its own destiny which does not coincide with the fate of the French Political System (at least in the present conditions of that system).

This representation of the French Communist Party based on the "theory" of the two poles, has led us to draw the following hypothesis:

The persistence of the system of the French Communist Party rests upon its capacity to filter the innovations which are in conformity with its very nature.

This hypothesis calls into question the premisses and the conclusions of systems approach.

In systems analysis, the researcher seeks to explain how a system

behaves under stressed conditions. The process whereby a system faces stresses follows this pattern:

- transmission of inputs (demands and supports) to the system
- conversion of these inputs into outputs (decisions) by the authorities of the system
- retroaction (feedback) of these decisions and actions upon the environment

Easton's approach thus starts by postulating that the persistence of a sub-system (i.e. the French Communist Party) requires adaptation to the environment and compliance to the pressures from the system (i.e. the French Political System). This postulate and the explanatory scheme it generates seem largely inadequate when attempting to describe the FCP's behavior because (1) the system of the French Communist Party must be seen as an independent system competing with the French Political System with different goals and purposes, (2) a great part of the inputs directed to the FCP are in fact withinputs originated by the authorities of the Party and thus they do not constitute stresses for it, (3) from this observation, stems the inadequacy of the "dynamic response model" drawn by Easton, according to which demands and supports present themselves for political settlement by the Communist authorities at one level of entry into the French Communist System.

However, the FCP has partially assimilated into the French Political System and responds to a certain extent to stresses from its environment. But changes which are only introduced at the pole of the contact with the established society, are assimilated only if compatible with the components of the other pole which does not vary. Thus, when we say for example that the FCP has changed its behavior during the Popular Front period and responded to pressures from the environment or, when we assert that demands

from Communist intellectuals have led to an evolution of the position of the FCP with respect to matters of art and theory, it must be admitted that these changes or innovations have not changed the nature of the Communist Party.

Systems approach seems to be largely unsatisfactory, partly because it does not take into account the double essence of the French Communist Party. The same applies for functionalism which provides useful concepts for the investigation of the relationships between the Communist Party and the French Political System, but only for what the FCP has in common with other parties. An analysis of the functional consequences of the presence of the French Communist Party would lead the researcher to assess that the FCP not only performs the "vote structuring" function (as other parties do) but also a specific function of "encadrement" of the masses through a quantity of mass organizations, schools or informal ties. We could hardly sustain that the Communist Party, through the formation of its cadres and militants, contributes to the dominant system. If we turn to the consequences of the nature of the FCP, it can be shown either that the Party performs a "programmatic" function of a "tribunitial" function. However, by doing so, we only take into account the level of the contact with the existing French Political System.

If we keep in mind the other pole of the FCP which, above circumstantial adaptations to the dominant system, retains the identity of the Party, it appears that the Communist insertion in the established society corresponds rather to the progressive organization of the transfer of power for its own. If finally the French Political System succeeds in eroding the French Communist Party, the result will be an increased support for the system since the FCP would then bring into the system its followers. However, it is

not yet possible to decide who if at all (the FCP or the French Political System) has been eroded the most. If the Political System is withstanding the pressure, then so is the French Communist Party.

FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER 1

¹Richard Cornell, "Comparative Analysis of Communist Movements", The Journal of Politics, XXX, (February, 1968), pp. 66-90.

²On the origins of the French Communist Movement, the best source is; Annie Kriegel, Aux Origines du Communisme Français, (2 vols.; Paris: Mouton, 1964).

³Quoted in Claude Willard, Socialisme et Communisme Français, (Paris: Armand Colin, 1967), p. 102.

⁴The line of separation between Socialists and Communists at the Congress of Tours was as follows:

- | | |
|---|-------------------------------------|
| — Revolutionary trade unionism | |
| — Left minority of the SFIO | These groups will |
| — Centrist majority favorable to the adherence to the Third International | constitute the new Communist Party. |
| ----- | |
| — Centrist minority disfavorable to the adherence to the International | These groups will stay |
| — Longuettists | in the Socialist Party. |
| — Rightist minority | |

⁵Annie Kriegel, Les Communistes Français, (2d. ed.; Paris: Seuil, 1970), pp. 177-178.

⁶Quoted in Claude Willard, Socialisme et Communisme, p. 109.

⁷Ibid., p. 111.

⁸Ibid.

⁹Ibid., p. 113.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 114.

¹¹Quoted in Jacques Fauvet, Histoire du Parti Communiste Français, (2 vols.; Paris: Fayard, 1964-1965), p. 231.

¹²Quoted by Louis Bodin, "Le Parti Communiste Dans le Front Populaire", Esprit, X, 4, (October, 1966), p. 440.

¹³L'Humanité, (October, 18, 1936), quoted in Georges Lavau, "Le Parti Communiste Dans le Systeme Politique Français", Le Communisme en France, Cahier de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 175, (Paris: A. Colin, 1969), p. 35.

- ¹⁴Quoted in Jacques Fauvel, Histoire, p. 243
- ¹⁵Ibid.
- ¹⁶Maurice Thorez, radio speech (April, 1936), quoted in Claude Willard, Socialisme et Communisme, p. 114.
- ¹⁷Quoted in Louis Bodin, "Le Parti Communiste", p. 446.
- ¹⁸Ibid., p. 447.
- ¹⁹Maurice Thorez, Interview for The Times, (November, 1946), quoted in Jacques Chapsal, La Vie Politique en France Depuis 1940, (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1966).
- ²⁰Quoted in Georges Lavau, "Le Parti Communiste", p. 38.
- ²¹Ibid., p. 37.
- ²²James Rosenau, "Toward the Study of National-International Linkage", Linkage Politics, James Rosenau, ed., (New York: The Free Press, 1969), p. 45.
- ²³Ibid., p. 46.
- ²⁴Ibid., p. 58.
- ²⁵Annie Kriegel, Les Communistes, p. 179.
- ²⁶Ibid., p. 188.
- ²⁷Karl Deutsch, Politics and Government, (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Co., 1970), p. 147.
- ²⁸Quoted by Annie Kriegel, Les Communistes, p. 251.
- ²⁹Georges Marchais, L'Humanité, (March, 5, 1968).
- ³⁰Annie Kriegel, "La Dimension Internationale du PCF", Politique Etrangère, 5, (1972), p. 660. These quotations are taken from L'Humanité.
- ³¹Among the seventeen members of the Political Bureau elected in 1967, (XVIIIth Congress), three already belonged to it before World War II (Billoux, Duclos and Frachon), two had had access to it in 1945 (Fajon and Guyot). The twelve remaining members have had the same "cursus", built on the following pattern: deputy member of the Central Committee, member, deputy member of the Political Bureau, member.
- ³²Annie Kriegel, Les Communistes, p. 238.
- ³³Quoted in Guy Rossi Landi, "Le Parti Communiste Français, Structures, Composition, Moyens d'Action", Le Communisme en France, p. 234.
- ³⁴Roger Vaillant, Drôle de Jeu, (Marat in...).
- ³⁵Daniel Mothé, "Le Militant entre la Théorie et la Pratique", Esprit, X, 4, (October, 1966), p. 391.

CHAPTER 2

¹David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life, (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1965), p. 18.

²Ibid., p. 21.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid., p. 220.

⁵_____ A Framework for Political Analysis, (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1965), p. 27.

⁶Talcott Parsons and Edward Shils eds., Toward a General Theory of Action, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951), p. 23.

⁷David Easton, A Framework, p. 51.

⁸This does not mean however that a para-political system should automatically be considered as a sub-system of a larger political system. We could easily affirm that the system of the FCP is as encompassing as the French Political System because they both represent a deliberate effort to change society.

⁹David Easton, Systems Analysis, p. 192.

¹⁰If we refer to Marx's doctrine of "ideology", we mean the doctrine that, except for the self-conscious "avant garde" of the proletariat, men do not possess truth but merely systems of belief that reflect and support the interests of their economic class. In Marx's vocabulary, ideology always refers to more or less conscious disguises of the real nature of a situation. Thus, a Marxist could not speak reasonably of Marxist or Communist ideology. However, it should be pointed out that the adjective "ideological" (if not the substantive itself) is sometimes used by French Communist when for example, the Communist militant is invited to participate in the ideological struggle or to perfect his ideological formation.

¹¹The position of "President of the FCP" is an honorific title created for Maurice Thorez.

¹²David Easton, Systems Analysis, p. 200.

¹³Annie Kriegel, Les Communistes Français, (2d. ed.; Paris: Seuil, 1970), p. 118.

¹⁴David Easton, Systems Analysis, p. 177.

¹⁵Georges Lavau, "A la Recherche d'un Cadre Théorique Pour l'Etude du Parti Communiste Français", Revue Française de Science Politique, XVIII, 3, (1969), pp. 445-466.

¹⁶Annick Percheron, "A Propos de l'Application du Cadre Théorique d'Easton à l'Etude du Parti Communiste Français", Revue Française de Science Politique, XX, 1, (1970), pp. 75-92.

¹⁷Herbert Spiro, "An Evaluation of Systems Theory", Contemporary Political Analysis, J. Charlesworth ed., (Homewood, Ill.: The Dorsey Press, 1973), p. 170.

¹⁸Annick Percheron, "A Propos de l'Application", p. 87.

¹⁹David Easton, Systems Analysis, p. 56.

²⁰_____ A Framework, p. 132.

²¹Annie Kriegel, Les Communistes, p. 247.

²²Ibid., p. 248.

²³Ibid., p. 250.

²⁴Morton Kaplan, "Systems Theory", Contemporary Political Analysis, p. 152.

²⁵Annie Kriegel, Les Communistes, p. 251.

²⁶Ibid., p. 253.

²⁷Richard Cornell, "Comparative Analysis of Communist Movements", The Journal of Politics, XXX, (February, 1968), p. 84.

²⁸Jean Ranger, "Le Vote Communiste Depuis 1945", Le Communisme en France, Cahier de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 175, (Paris: Armand Colin, 1969), p. 214.

²⁹The results of this public opinion poll have been published in Les Cahiers du Communisme, 12, (December, 1967) and 1, (January, 1968).

³⁰Jean Ranger, "Le Vote Communiste", p. 224.

³¹Georges Lavau, "Le Parti Communiste Dans le Système Politique Français", Le Communisme en France, p. 14.

³²Quoted in Georges Lavau, Ibid., p. 36.

³³Georges Cogniot, Cahiers du Communisme, (May, 1963), p. 10.

³⁴See for example, Joseph Klatzmann, "Comportement Electoral et Classes Sociales", Les Elections du 2 Janvier 1956, Cahier de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 82, (Paris: Armand Colin, 1967), pp. 254-285; also, Mattei Dogan, "Le Vote Ouvrier en France", Revue Française de Sociologie, 6, (1965).

³⁵Gérard Adam, ed., L'Ouvrier en France en 1970, (Paris: Armand Colin, 1970).

³⁶Richard Cornell, "Comparative Analysis", p. 82.

³⁷Annie Kriegel, Les Communistes, p. 82.

³⁸Claude Harmel, "A Propos des Effectifs de la CGT", Etudes Sociales et Syndicales, 174, (April, 1970), p. 5.

³⁹Paul Vaillant Couturier, "Les Intellectuels et l'Internationale Communiste", Clarté, (Décembre, 1921), quoted in David Caute, Communism and the French Intellectuals, 1914-1960, (New York: MacMillan, 1964), p. 24.

⁴⁰Arthur Koestler, The God That Failed, quoted in David Caute, Ibid., p. 26.

⁴¹David Caute, Ibid., p. 28.

⁴²Cahiers du Communisme, (July, August, 1966), p. 176.

⁴³Ibid., p. 394.

⁴⁴"Résolution d'Argenteuil", Cahiers du Communisme, (May, June, 1966); the following references are quoted from the same source.

⁴⁵Staline, "Les Problèmes Economiques du Capitalisme", Derniers Ecrits, 1950-1953, (Paris: Editions Sociales, 1953), p. 130.

⁴⁶Maurice Thorez, "La Situation Economique de la France: Mystification ou Réalité?", Une Tragique Réalité; La Paupérisation des Travailleurs Français, (Paris: Editions Sociales, 1961).

⁴⁷Ibid., pp. 49-50.

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 64.

⁴⁹_____, "Rassemblons toutes les forces pour la dure bataille contre le pouvoir personnel", Discours de Clôture de la Conférence Fédérale de Paris, (May, 1959), Cahiers du Communisme, 6, (June, 1959), p. 692.

⁵⁰Waldeck-Rochet, "Le Capitalisme Monopoliste d'Etat", Conférence Internationale de Choisy-le-Roi, (May, 1966), Economie et Politique, (June, July, 1966), p. 240.

⁵¹Georges Frishmann, "Périls du Marché Commun et Contradictions Européennes", Cahiers du Communisme, (December, 1958), p. 1646.

⁵²Ibid., p. 1647.

⁵³Ibid., p. 1641.

⁵⁴Ibid., p. 1944.

⁵⁵Economie et Politique, (November, December, 1962), p. 5.

⁵⁶Ibid.

⁵⁷Ibid., p. 9.

⁵⁸See the interview of the Italian economist E. Serini in l'Unita, XVI, (September, 1962).

⁵⁹Economie et Politique, (November- December, 1962), p. 10.

⁶⁰Ibid., p. 14.

⁶¹Henry Claude, "La Fausse Querelle de l'Europe", Economie et Politique, (June, 1962), p. 3.

⁶²Jacques Kahn, "Monopoles, Nations et Marché Commun", Cahiers du Communisme, (April, 1962), p. 16.

⁶³Roger Garaudy, "De Gaulle et le Fascisme", Cahiers du Communisme, (June, 1958), p. 899.

⁶⁴Cahiers du Communisme, (July- August, 1959), p. 524.

⁶⁵Maurice Thorez, "Intervention au Comité Central d'Ivry", l'Humanité (February, 25, 1961).

⁶⁶Cahiers du Communisme, (July- August, 1959), p. 527.

⁶⁷"Déclaration du Bureau Politique du Parti Communiste Français", l'Humanité, (September, 18, 1959).

⁶⁸Maurice Thorez, "Négociation Immédiate sur la Base de l'Auto-détermination", l'Humanité, (October, 26, 1959).

⁶⁹Cahiers du Communisme, (July-August, 1962), p. 5.

⁷⁰"Communiqué du Bureau Politique du Parti Communiste Français", Cahiers du Communisme, (July-August, 1962), p. 179.

⁷¹"Déclaration du Bureau Politique du Parti Communiste Français", Cahiers du Communisme, (September, 1963), p. 108.

⁷²Maurice Thorez, "Intervention au Comité Central d'Ivry", Cahiers du Communisme, (April, 1964), p. 126.

⁷³Waldeck-Rochet, "Rapport d'Activité du Comité Central", Cahiers du Communisme, (June-July, 1964), p. 35.

⁷⁴_____, "Rapport d'Activité du Comité Central", Cahiers du Communisme, (February-March, 1965), p. 31.

⁷⁵Cahiers du Communisme, (June-July, 1964), p. 512.

⁷⁶Georges Marchais, l'Humanité, (January, 6, 1972).

⁷⁷Jacques Denis, l'Humanité, (April, 20, 1972).

¹Henry Ehrmann, Politics in France, (2d. ed.; Boston: Little Brown, 1971), p. 207.

²William Flanigan and Edwin Fogelman, "Functional Analysis", Contemporary Political Analysis, J. Charlesworth, ed., (Homewood Ill.: The Dorsey Press, 1973), pp. 72-85.

³Ibid., p. 73.

⁴Frank Sorauf, Political Parties in the American System, (Boston: Little Brown, 1964).

⁵David Apter, The Politics of Modernization, (Chicago: University University Press, 1965).

⁶Ibid., p. 187.

⁷W. Flanigan and E. Fogelman, "Functional Analysis", p. 76.

⁸Talcott Parsons, Toward a General Theory of Action, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951) and, Marion Levy, The Structure of Society, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951).

⁹Gabriel Almond and James Coleman, The Politics of the Developing Areas, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960) and, G. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Comparative Politics, A Developmental Approach, (Boston: Little Brown, 1966).

¹⁰G. Almond and B. Powell, Comparative Politics, p. 14.

¹¹Ibid.

¹²Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, (New York: The Free Press, 1957).

¹³In addition to the three functional requisites of Almond, it is worth to point out the systematic effort of Marion Levy and others, "The Functional Pre-Requisites of a Society", Ethics, LX, 2, (January, 1950), quoted in R. Macridis and B. Brown, eds., Comparative Politics, (4th. ed.; Homewood Ill.: The Dorsey Press, 1972), pp. 61-72. Marion Levy distinguishes nine functional pre-requisites that is, "things that must get done in any society if it is to continue as a going concern".

¹⁴Oran Young, Systems of Political Science, (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1968), p. 31.

¹⁵Robert K. Merton, Social Theory, p. 49.

¹⁶Howard Scarrow, "The Functions of Political Parties , A Critique of the Literature and the Approach", The Journal of Politics, XXIX, 4, (November, 1967), p. 772.

- ¹⁷R. Merton, Social Theory, p. 50.
- ¹⁸———, On Theoretical Sociology, (New York: The Free Press, 1967), p. 105.
- ¹⁹H. Scarrow, "The Functions", pp. 778-779.
- ²⁰Leon Epstein, Political Parties in Western Democracies, (New York: Praeger, 1968), p. 77.
- ²¹Maurice Duverger, Les Partis Politiques, (6th. ed.; Paris: Armand Colin, 1967).
- ²²Ibid., p. 229.
- ²³Guy Michelat, "Attitudes et Comportements Politiques a l'Automne 1962", Le Référendum d'Octobre et les Elections de Novembre 1962, Cahier de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 142, (Paris: Armand Colin, 1965).
- ²⁴Pierre Fougeyrollas, La Conscience Politique Dans la France Contemporaine, (Paris: Denoël, 1963).
- ²⁵Sondages, 3, (1952), quoted in Jean Ranger, "Le Vote Communiste Depuis 1945", Le Communisme en France, Cahier de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 175, (Paris: Armand Colin, 1969).
- ²⁶Jean Ranger, Ibid., p. 230.
- ²⁷Ibid.
- ²⁸Charles Roig and Françoise Billon-Grand, La Socialisation Politique en France, Cahier de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 155, (Paris: Armand Colin, 1965).
- ²⁹Sondages, 3, (1952), quoted in Jean Ranger, "Le Vote Communiste", p. 238.
- ³⁰Letter from Trotsky to the Comité Directeur (Leadership Committee) of the French Communist Party, quoted in Annie Kriegel, Les Communistes Français, (2d. ed.; Paris: Seuil, 1970), p. 126.
- ³¹Quoted in Annie Kriegel, Les Communistes, p. 130.
- ³²Etienne Fajon, "Rapport à la Conférence Nationale sur les Problèmes de l'Humanité et de la Presse Quotidienne Communiste", l'Humanité, (February, 8, 1965).
- ³³In 1956, five daily regional Communist newspapers have been discontinued Les Nouvelles de Bordeaux, Le Patriote du Sud-Ouest, (Toulouse), L'Ouest Matin, (Rennes), Le Patriote, (Saint Etienne), Les Allobroges, (Grenoble). The three remaining regional Communist newspapers are: L'Echo du Centre, (Limoges), Liberté, (Lille) and La Marseillaise.

³⁴Cahiers du Communisme, (June-July, 1954), p. 74.

³⁵Annie Kriegel, Les Communistes, p. 20.

³⁶Ibid., p. 26.

³⁷Etienne Fajon, "Apprendre Pour Mieux Comprendre et Mieux Lutter", Les Cahiers du Bolchévisme, (1935), quoted in G. Rossi Landi, "Le Parti Communiste Français, Structures, Composition, Moyens d'Action", Le Communisme en France, p. 171.

³⁸Ibid., p. 202.

³⁹Ibid.

⁴⁰Annie Kriegel, Les Communistes, p. 173.

⁴¹Ibid.

⁴²Robert de Jouvenel, La République des Camarades, (1914).

⁴³Quoted in Maurice Duverger, Les Partis Politiques, p. 227.

⁴⁴Pierre Ferrari and Herbert Maisl, Les Groupes Communistes aux Assemblées Parlementaires Française et Italienne, 1962-1967, (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1968).

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 189.

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 200.

⁴⁷Theodore Lowi, "Party Policy and Constitution in America", The American Party System, Stages of Political Development, Chambers and Burnham, eds., (Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 238-276.

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 239.

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 240.

⁵⁰Ibid., p. 276.

⁵¹Giovanni Sartori, "European Political Parties, The Case of Polarized Pluralism", Political Parties and Political Development, Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner, eds., (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 147.

⁵²Georges Lavau, "Le Parti Communiste Dans le Systeme Politique Francais", Le Communisme en France, pp. 7-82.

⁵³Ibid., pp. 25-26.

⁵⁴See Harry Scobble, "Access to Politics" (article), The International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. I.

⁵⁵Michael Parenti, "Power and Pluralism, A View From the Bottom", The Journal of Politics, XXXII, (August, 1970).

⁵⁶David Truman, The Governmental Process; Political Interests and Political Opinions, (New York: Knopf, 1951).

⁵⁷Robert Dahl, Democracy in the United States: Promise and Performance, (2d. ed.; Chicago: Rand Mc Nally, 1972), pp. 35-46.

⁵⁸Karl Deutsch, Political Community in the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 5.

⁵⁹See G. Almond and S. Verba, The Civic Culture, (Boston: Little Brown, 1967).

⁶⁰F. Parkin, "Working Class Conservatives: A Theory of Political Deviance", British Journal of Sociology, XVIII, (1970), quoted by Michael Mann, "The Social Cohesion of Liberal Democracy", Contemporary Analytical Theory, D. Apter and C. Andrain, eds., (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1972), p. 214.

⁶¹Fred Riggs, "The Comparison of Whole Political Systems", The Methodology of Comparative Research, Holt and Turner, eds., (New York: The Free Press, 1970), p. 84.

⁶²Alfred Grosser, "France, Nothing But Opposition", Political Opposition in Western Democracies, R. Dahl, ed., (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 284-302.

⁶³ The social objective of the program are (1) the defense of the increase in salaries, wages and pensions, (2) the defense and the consolidation of the Social Security, (3) the defense of the employment... (4) the defense and the promotion of the disfavored categories...

J. Fabre, "Un Programme Démocratique, Buts et Moyens", Economie et Politique, (December, 1967), pp. 398-399.

⁶⁴Guy Michelat, "Les Réactions de l'Opinion Publique a l'Egard des Forces Politiques en Décembre 1962", Revue Française de Science Politique, XIII, 2, (June, 1963), pp. 391-409.

⁶⁵Gabriel Almond, "Comparative Political Systems", The Journal of Politics, XVII, (1956), p. 405.

⁶⁶Mark Kesselman, "Overinstitutionalization and Political Contract; The Case of France", Comparative Politics, III, 1, (October, 1970).

⁶⁷Ronald Tierski, Le Mouvement Communiste en France, 1920-1972, (Paris: Fayard, 1973), p. 276.

⁶⁸Otto Kirchheimer, "The Transformation of the European Party System", Political Parties and Political Development, p. 190.

⁶⁹Ibid., p. 192.

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